George Stigler Quotes

We are entitled to be disappointed, but not to be surprised, by the persistence of governmental intervention in economic life. A school of thought attributes great influence to public opinion in the movements toward or away from laissez-faire. Among the many members of this school one may mention Albert Venn Dicey, John Maynard Keynes, and Milton Friedman.

Whether one is a conservative or a radical, a protectionist or a free trader, a cosmopolitan or a nationalist, a churchman or a heathen, it is useful to know the causes and consequences of economic phenomena.

The essence of scientific progress is to edge up this ladder from ignorance to knowledge, and it is complicated by the fact that the ladder keeps getting longer!

A useful role exists for the economist is making calculations of the prospective costs and/or benefits of alternative policies. This role is precisely the one Keynes had in mind, I assume, when he expressed the hope that we would become useful after the fashion of dentists.

One should hardly have to tell academicians that information is a valuable resource: knowledge is power. And yet this occupies a slum dwelling in the town of economics. Mostly it is ignored.

Regulation may be actively sought by an industry, or it may be thrust upon it. A central thesis of this paper is that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit. There are regulations whose net effects upon the regulated industry are undeniably onerous; a simple example is the differentially heavy taxation of the industry's product (whiskey, playing cards). These onerous regulations, however, are exceptional and can be explained by the same theory that explains beneficial (we may call it "acquired") regulation.

A modern economic system is of extraordinary complexity. Imagine a three-dimensional jigsaw puzzle, consisting of roughly 100 million parts. Some parts touch against, let us say, 1,000 other parts. (That is, each family deals at one time or another with that many employers, banks, retail stores, domestic servants, and so on.) Other parts touch—let us be conservative—50,000 other parts (firms that sell to retailers and buy from other firms and hire laborers and so on). It would be enough of a task to fit these 100 million pieces together, but the real difficulties have yet to be mentioned. The pieces change shape quite often—a family has twins; a firm does the next best thing and invents a new product. The economist has the interesting task of predicting (in the aggregate) each of these movements. Meanwhile a busy set of people—congressmen, members of regulatory bodies, central bankers, and the like—are changing the rules on who or what the jigsaw pieces will be and how they are shaped. And of course there are other jigsaw puzzles (foreign economies) of comparable complexity, and these other puzzles are connected at literally a million points with our puzzle.

The user of a theory has a simpler task: his not to reason why, his but to sigh and try. If the right element in the diverse situations has been isolated, the theory will work: it will yield predictions better than those which can be reached with any alternative theory.

Some important aspects of important aspects of economic organization take on a new meaning when they are considered from the viewpoint of the search of information.

Lacking education, lacking a tenacity of purpose, lacking a willingness to work hard, he will not be an object of employers' competition. What leader of Negro thought is fostering the ancient virtues of diligence and honesty and loyalty? It is so much easier to seek quotas for Negroes?

And anyway, although a fancy theory is not so good as a simple one (more things can go wrong with the fancy one), a fancy theory is better than none. Let the reader try to contrive an alternative explanation of the fact that prices of washing machines vary relatively more than prices of automobiles. He may come up with a rule such as the more expensive the commodity, the less its price varies, which seems to fit our facts-in fact, it makes the same prediction. But quite aside from the fact that it has no logical basis, this alternative explanation will often be wrong: the price of sugar varies much less than that of tea, although sugar costs less per pound. This is not a contradiction of our theory, which in a fuller version says that the aggregate amount spent on a commodity governs the amount of search.

The state --the machinery and power of the state-- is a potential resource or threat to every industry in the society. With its power to prohibit or compel, to take or give money, the state can and does selectively help or hurt a vast number of industries. That political juggernaut, the petroleum industry, is an immense consumer of political benefits, and simultaneously the underwriters of marine insurance have their more modest repast. The central tasks of the theory of economic regulation are to explain who will receive the benefits or burdens of regulation, what form regulation will take, and the effects of regulation upon the allocation of resources.

Price dispersion is a manifestation — and, indeed, it is the measure — of ignorance in the market. Dispersion is a biased measure of ignorance because there is never absolute homogeneity in the commodity if we include the terms of sale within the concept of the commodity. Thus, some automobile dealers might perform more service, or carry a larger range of varieties in stock, and a portion of the observed dispersion is presumably attributable to such differences. But it would be metaphysical, and fruitless, to assert that all dispersion is due to heterogeneity.

Two main alternative views of the regulation of industry are widely held. The first is that regulation is instituted primarily for the protection and benefit of the public at large or some large subclass of the public. In this view, the regulations which injure the public -as when the oil import quotas increase the cost of petroleum products to America by $5 billion or more a year- are costs of some social goal (here, national defense) or, occasionally, perversions of the regulatory philosophy. the second view is essentially that the political process defies rational explanation: "politics" is an imponderable, a constantly and unpredictably shifting mixture of forces of the most diverse nature, comprehending acts of great moral virtue (the emancipation of slaves) and of the most vulgar venality (the congressman feathering his own nest).

A rational man must be guided by the incentive system within which he operates. No matter what his own personal desires, he must be discouraged from certain activities if they carry penalties and attracted toward others if they carry large rewards. The carrot and the stick guide scientists and politicians as well as donkeys.