Advanced Search Filters
Filter search results by source, date, and more with our premium search tools.
" "WHEN a 'Mussulman apostizes from the faith, and exposition thereof is to be laid before him, in such manner that if his apostacy should have arisen from any religious doubts or scruples, those may be removed. The reason for laying an exposition of the faith before him is that it is possible some doubt or errors may have arisen in his mind, which may be removed by such exposition; and as there are only two modes of repelling the sin of apostacy, namely, destruction or Islám, and Islám is preferable to destruction, the evil is rather to be removed by means of an exposition of the faith;—but yet this exposition of the faith is not incumbent, (according to what the learned have remarked upon this head,) since a call to the faith has already reached the apostate. AN apostate is to be imprisoned for three days, within which time if he return to the faith, it is well: but if not, he must be slain.—It is recorded in the Jama Sagbeer that "an exposition of the faith is to be laid before an apostate, and if he refuse the faith, he must be slain:"—and with respect to what is above stated, that "he is to be imprisoned for three days," it only implies that if he require a delay, three days may be granted him, as such is the term generally admitted and allowed for the purpose of consideration. It is recorded from Haneefa and Aboo Yoosaf that the granting of a delay of three days is laudable, whether the apostate require it or not: and it is recorded from Shafei that it is incumbent on the Iman to delay for three days, and that it is not lawful for him to put the apostate to death before the lapse of that time; since it is most probable that a Mussulman will not apostatise but from some doubt or error arising in his mind; wherefore some time is necessary for consideration; and this is fixed at three days. THe arguments of our doctors upon this point are twofold.—FIRST, GOD says, in the Korán, "SLAY THE UNBELIEVERS," without any reserve of a delay of three days being granted to them; and the prophet has also said "Slay the man who changes his religion," without mentioning any thing concerning a delay: SECONDLY, an apostate is an infidel enemy, who has received a call to the faith, wherefore he may be slain upon the instant, without delay. An apostate is termed on this occasion and infidel enemy, because he is undoubtedly such; and he is not protected, since he has not requered a protection, neither is he a Zimmee, because capitation-tax has not been accepted from him; hence is proved that he is an infidel enemy. It is to be observed that, in these rules, there is no difference made between an apostate who is a freeman, and one who is a slave, as the arguments upon which they are established apply equally to both descriptions.
Burhān al-Dīn Abu’l-Ḥasan ‘Alī bin Abī Bakr bin ‘Abd al-Jalīl al-Farghānī al-Marghīnānī (Arabic: برهان الدين المرغيناني) was an Islamic scholar of the school of jurisprudence. He was born in Marghinan near Farghana in 530/1135 (in present day ) He died in 593/1197.
Filter search results by source, date, and more with our premium search tools.
Related quotes. More quotes will automatically load as you scroll down, or you can use the load more buttons.
The construction of churches or synagogues in the Mussulman territory is unlawful, this being forbidden in the traditions:—but if places of worship originally belonging to Jews or Christians be destroyed, or fall to decay, they are at liberty to repair them,—because buildings cannot endure for ever, and as the Imán has left these people to the exercise of their own religion, it is a necessary inference that he has engaged not to prevent them from rebuilding or repairing their church and synagogues. If, however, they attempt to remove these, and to build them in a place different from their former situation, the Imán must prevent them, since this is and actual construction: and the places which they use as bermitages are held in the same light as their churches, wherefore the construction of those also is unlawful. It is otherwise with respect to such places of prayer as are within their dwellings, which they are not prohibited from constructing, because these are an appearance to the habitation. What is here said is the rule with respect to the cities; but not with respect to villages or hamlets; because as the tokens of Islám (such as public prayer, festivals, and so forth) appear in cities, Zimmees should not be permitted to celebrate the tokens of infidelity there, in the face of them; but as tokens of Islám do not appear in villages or hamlets, there is no occasion to prevent the construction of synagogues, not only in cities, but also in villages and hamlets; because in the villages of our country various tokens of Islám appear; and what is recorded from Haneefa, (that the prohibition against building churches and synagogues is confined to cities, and does not extend to villages and hamlets) relates solely to the villages of Koofa, because the greater part of the inhabitants of the villages are Zimmes, there being few Mussulmans among them, wherefore the tokens of Islám do not there appear: moreover, in the territory of Arabia, Zimmees are prohibited from constructing churches or synagogues either in cities or villages, because the prophet has said "Two religions cannot be professed together in the peninsula of Arabia."
"It is not incumbent upon infants to make war, as they are objects of compassion; neither is it incumbent upon slaves or women, as the rights of the master, or of the husband, have precedence; nor is it so upon the blind, the maimed, or the decrepid, as such are incapable. If, however, the infidels make an attack upon a city or territory, in this case the repulsion of them is incumbent upon all Muslims, insomuch that a wife may go forth without consent of her husband, and a slave without the leave of his master, because war then becomes a positive injunction; and possession, either by bondage or by marriage, cannot come in competition with a positive injunction, as in prayer (for instance) or fasting. This is supposing a general summons; for without that it is not lawful for a woman or slave to go forth to make war without the consent of the husband or master, as there is in this case no necessity for their assistance, since others suffice, and hence no reason exists for destroying the right of the husband or master on that account. If there be any fund in the public treasury, so long as the fund lasts any extraordinary exaction for the support of the warriors is abominable, because such exaction resembles a hire for that which is a service of God as much as prayer or fasting, and, hire being forbidden in these instances, so is it in that which resembles them. In this case, moreover, there is no occasion for any extraordinary exactions, since the funds of the public treasury are prepared to answer all emergencies of the Muslims, such as war, and so forth. If, however, there be no funds in the public treasury, in this case the Imam need not hesitate to levy contributions for the better support of the warriors, because in levying a contribution the greater evil (namely, the destruction of the person) is repelled, and the contribution is the smaller evil, and the imposition of a smaller evil to remedy a greater is of no consequence. A confirmation of this is found in what is related of the Prophet, that he took various articles of armour, and so forth, from Safwan and ‘Umar; in the same manner also he took property from married men, and bestowed it upon the unmarried, in order to encourage them and enable them to go forth to fight with cheerfulness; and he also used to take the horses from those who remained at home, and bestowed them upon those who went forth to fight on foot. When the Muslims enter the enemy’s country and besiege the cities or strongholds of the infidels, it is necessary to invite them to embrace the faith, because Ibn ‘Abbas relates of the Prophet that he never destroyed any without previously inviting them to embrace the faith. If, therefore, they embrace the faith, it is unnecessary to war with them, because that which was the design of the war is then obtained without war. The Prophet, moreover, has said we are directed to make war upon men only until such time as they shall confess, ‘There is no God but one God.’ But when they repeat this creed, their persons and properties are in protection (aman). If they do accept the call to the faith, they must then be called upon to pay jizyah, or capitation tax, because the Prophet directed the commanders of his armies so to do, and also because by submitting to this tax war is forbidden and terminated upon the authority of the Qur’an. (This call to pay capitation tax, however, respects only those from whom the capitation tax is acceptable, or, as to apostates and the idolaters of Arabia, to call upon them to pay the tax is useless, since nothing is accepted from them but embracing the faith, as it is thus commanded in the Qur’an). If those who are called upon to pay capitation tax consent to do so, they then become entitled to the same protection and subject to the same rules as Muslims because ‘Ali had declared infidels agree to a capitation tax only in order to render their blood the same as Muslims’ blood, and their property the same as Muslims’ property.
Enjoy ad-free browsing, unlimited collections, and advanced search features with Premium.
"If the Imam make peace with aliens, or with any particular tribe or body of them, and perceive it to be eligible for the Muslims, there need be no hesitation, because it is said in the Qur’an: ‘If the infidels be inclined to peace do ye likewise consent thereto,’ and also because the Prophet in the year of the punishment of Eubea, made a peace between the Muslims and the people of Mecca for the space of ten years; peace, moreover is war in effect where the interest of the Muslims requires it, since the design of war is the removal of evil, and this is obtained by means of peace: contrary to where peace is not to the interest of the Muslims, for it is not in that case lawful, as this would be abandoning war both apparently and in effect. It is here, however, proper to observe that it is not absolutely necessary to restrict a peace to the term above recorded (namely, ten years), because the end for which peace is made may be sometimes more effectually obtained by extending it to a longer term. If the Imam make peace with the aliens for a single term (namely, ten years), and afterwards perceive that it is most advantageous for the Muslim’s interest to break it, he may in that case lawfully renew the war after giving them due notice, because, upon a change of the circumstances which rendered peace advisable, the breach of peace is war, and the observance of it a desertion of war, both in appearance and also in effect, and war is an ordinance of God, and the forsaking of it is not becoming (to Muslims). It is to be observed that giving due notice to the enemy is in this case indispensably requisite in such a manner that treachery may not be induced, since this is forbidden. It is also requisite that such a delay be made in renewing the war with them, as may allow intelligence of the peace being broken off to be universally received among them, and for this such a time suffices as may admit of the king or chief of the enemy communicating the same to the different parts of their dominion, since by such a delay the charge of treachery is avoided.".."If the infidels act with perfidy in a peace, it is in such case lawful for the Imam to attack them without any previous notice, since the breach of treaty in this instance originates with them, whence there is no occasion to commence the war on the part of the Muslims by giving them notice. It would be otherwise, however, if only a small party of them were to violate the treaty by entering the Muslim territory and there committing robberies upon the Muslims, since this does not amount to a breach of treaty. If, moreover, this party be in force so as to be capable of opposition, and openly fight with the Muslims, this is a breach of treaty with respect to that party only, but not with respect to the rest of their nation or tribe, because, as this party have violated the treaty without any permission from their prince, the rest are not answerable for their act; whereas if they made their attack by permission of their prince, the breach of treaty would be regarded as by the whole, all being virtually implicated in it.