Y: As you think it wrong for man to kill other animals for food, do you also think it wrong that animals should devour each other? As this is the gen… - Lewis Gompertz
" "Y: As you think it wrong for man to kill other animals for food, do you also think it wrong that animals should devour each other? As this is the general law of nature.
Z: It appears wrong, according to the rules by which we govern our own actions to each other; and should I witness the attempt in any animal of destroying another, I would endeavour to frustrate it; though this might probably be wrong.
English
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About Lewis Gompertz
(1783/4 – 2 December 1861) was an English philosopher, writer, inventor, and social reformer. He was best known for his pioneering advocacy of the moral consideration of animals, early veganism, and opposition to animal exploitation. A founding member of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (later the RSPCA), he later established the Animals' Friend Society to promote a more comprehensive ethical stance toward animals. His 1824 treatise, Moral Inquiries on the Situation of Man and of Brutes, offered one of the first systematic critiques of animal use, combining philosophical argument with proposals for social reform. He also supported causes including women's rights, anti-slavery, and the welfare of the poor. In addition to his activism, Gompertz was an accomplished mechanical inventor who sought to develop alternatives to animal labour.
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Additional quotes by Lewis Gompertz
It has been generally, but not always, the custom of naturalists to degrade the powers of dumb animals into mere instinct, and not to allow them reason; and on the other hand to elevate the qualities of man, by entirely disavowing the power of instinct in man, giving him the use of reason alone. It appears to me, that there is such a quality as instinct; by which I understand a desire to do any thing without knowing why, or without having the object in view which it is to reach. I am of opinion that both reason and instinct act in man and also in brutes; and I will even grant that the proportion of reason to instinct is greater in man than in other animals; but that the latter possess a great portion of reason would it seems be absurd to dispute.
Y: I suppose you also deem it a crime to drink, as you destroy myriads of animals in the water of every draught?
Z: I consider this an evil, but not a crime, because I do not cause or wish them to be there, and would assist them to escape if possible. They have no more claim to the water than I have; and we know so little of the nature of these animals, that we are not even sure that they die when the water is drunk; the very fact of their being there is concealed from us, and but for the microscope we should never have known it. I however consider it wrong to waste water in anyway which may injure the animalcula.
Still we are not positive that if neither destroyed by enemies nor famine they would increase too much; because for aught we known the fecundity is only great because the destruction is great; instead of the numbers being limited by the destruction, as if nature had said to the camivori, do what you will, you shall not reduce the number of animals, the more you kill the more I will produce. Were the experiment tried on a small scale of letting them be well fed and indulged they might produce prodigiously, but if the experiment extended to their whole races a different result might for aught we know obtain, as we are ignorant of the law by which nature governs the mode of production.
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