There is also another aspect of this question. You cannot say because there has been a rising in Malabar among a notoriously turbulent people that th… - William Henry Hoare Vincent

‘It is difficult to arrive at an exact appreciation of the situation at present, but there seems to be no doubt that continual provocative speeches on the Khilafat question, combined with the resolutions of the recent All-India Khilafat Conference at Karachi, have produced an impression on the mind of the Mappilla that the end of the British Raj is at hand. It is certainly true that, as the result of Khilafat propaganda, the Mappillas are better organised than they used to be and also better informed as to the strength of their own position and the difficulty of taking military action against them.’ The first actual signs of lawlessness occurred on the 31st July when some Police-officers went to arrest a man who was accused in a criminal case. I think there had been a case of housebreaking in the residence of a Nambadri Brahmin. Armed Moplahs collected in large numbers to prevent the arrest, and there was grave danger of a serious riot. That was happily averted, and the police apparently, though this is not clear from the reports before me, went home without arresting any one. In any case, the police were powerless to face the mob, and the incident was significant because it was regarded by the Moplahs as a victory and a defeat for the Government. The District Magistrate then applied for extra troops to be sent to Calicut, and they were sent. Finally, on the 20th, the District Magistrate determined to arrest certain persons who were in the possession of arms, under the Moplah Outrages Act, at Tirurangala, with the aid of a military force. Three men were arrested without any trouble, and a party of police were left behind to search for others. In the course of this search a mosque was entered by the Moplah Police-officers who, however, removed their shoes before entering. I may say that in times past rebellious Moplahs have frequently taken refuge in mosques. While these occurrences were taking place, news had quickly spread round as to what was happening and a large mob of Moplahs collected, some coming by train and some on foot. This mob first attacked the party of police and later on in the day attacked the military forces to which I have referred. The attack was beaten off, but I regret to say with the loss of two British Officers, one being Lieutenant Johnstone of the Leinster Regiment and the other a Police-officer named Rowley. By this time railway communications had been cut and the telegraph wires destroyed, and the troops had to remain where they were. Subsequently the outbreak of violence in this single area of Tirurangadu developed into a general rising throughout a large part of the Malabar District of a definitely anti-Government character: Swaraj was proclaimed and a green flag hoisted. I have here rather an interesting account of the reasons for this outbreak from an officer who has had considerable experience of this locality. He has given me leave to use it. This is an extract of a letter received by him:

It would perhaps interest Honourable Members if I were to preface my remarks with a brief reference as to the origin and cause of this rising in Malabar. The fact is that these Moplahs are an ignorant people, many of them poor and nearly all of them fanatical and entirely under the influence—as I learn from the information before me—of a bigoted priesthood. As I think all Honourable Members know they are descendants of Arab traders and soldiers who first came to the Malabar coast some time, I think, about 800 AD, and we are told that they later established themselves by intermarriage and conversion, or perversion, whichever term appeals to different Honourable Members of this Council, of the local residents to Muhammadanism. There have been many outbreaks of these people who now number about a million in the past, indeed during a period of about 20 years—between 1836 and 1853, there were 22 outbreaks, but the biggest one about which I have any information occurred in 1885 after which 20,000 arms including 9,000 guns were collected from the insurgents.

I have explained that it is doubtful how far this movement or rising can be ascribed clearly to non-co-operation–non-violent non-co- operation, i.e., Mr. Gandhi’s movement, but it certainly seems on the information before us to be connected very definitely with the Khilafat. The policy of Government towards the non-co-operation movement has been very fully explained to this Council on previous occasions, but the Honourable Member now attacks me and says, ‘why did not Government do more? Why did you not take more vigorous action and prosecute these people, and arrest them.’ Now what I want to put to Honourable Members is that this Council cannot have it both ways. Last Session, when I stood up in this Council, and stood up in the Legislative Assembly, was there a single man here—except perhaps one or two—who asked Government to take any more strenuous measures than they were taking? I do not remember the Honourable Sir M. Dadabhoy standing up then and saying: ‘You must take more drastic action; you must strengthen your military forces, prosecute here, and prosecute there,’ and I think it is rather hard on us that we should be challenged therefore in this Council on that account. On the merits I would put it in this way. The question when to undertake and when to forbear from general repressive measures against a movement of this character is always one of difficulty for any Government to decide, and very much more difficult in present political circumstances in India. I think every one will admit that. The Government have been very much exercised over this situation, but we had no reason to believe that it was going to develop in such a speedy manner in this area.