Judges ought to remember that their office is to interpret law, and not to make law, or give law.

I understand Justice Scalia's jurisprudence to begin with a proposition that we should all agree to — namely, that judges should try to interpret the law correctly, and without personal or political bias.

"Robert Bork, at opening of Judiciary hearings:
How should a judge go about finding the law? The only legitimate way, in my opinion, is by attempting to discern what those who made the law intended...
As I wrote in an opinion for our court, the judge's responsibility "is to discern how the framers' values, defined in the context of the world they knew, apply in the world we know.
If a judge abandons intentions as his guide, there is no law available to him, and he begins to legislate a social agenda for the American people. That goes well beyond his powers..

I am often asked what it was like to be a woman clerking for Justice Scalia. “Much like being a man clerking for him” is my easy answer. Justice Scalia believed in one simple principle: That law came to the court as an is not an ought. Statutes, cases and the Constitution were to be read for what they said, not for what the judges wished they would say. Each of his opinions needed to conform to that principle and to be written clearly, forcefully and accurately. If you could help him with that, you were useful to him. If not, then not. When we were working, we sometimes joked that he could not even remember our names.

In a country ruled by laws, it seemed to me that nothing was more important than removing politics from the process of choosing judges. During previous administrations in California, governors had often handed out judgeships to friends and cronies like prizes at a company picnic. Not only had this produced a lot of inferior judges, it had placed a number of partisans on the bench who believed that putting on the black robes of a judge gave them a license to rewrite the laws. I wanted judges who would interpret the Constitution, not rewrite it.

This is a judge who is known for deciding cases based on how the law is actually written, not how he wishes it were written, even when it leads to results that conflict with his own political beliefs. He understands that his role as a judge is to interpret the law, not impose his own viewpoint. Here is how Judge Gorsuch himself put it: "A judge who likes every result he reaches is very likely a bad judge, reaching for results he prefers rather than those the law compels." Some of our colleagues and some others on the left see the role of a judge very differently. In last year's Presidential debate, our former colleague, Secretary Clinton, stated her view that a Supreme Court Justice--now listen to this--ought to look more favorably on certain political constituencies than others; that it was the job of the Supreme Court to "stand on the side" of this group or another over that one. Some of our current colleagues seem to share this view. The assistant Democratic leader said that what is important to him are the political views of a Supreme Court nominee, what or perhaps whom they are going to stand for.

Now the Senate is looking for 'moderate' judges, 'mainstream' judges. What in the world is a moderate interpretation of a constitutional text? Halfway between what it says and what we'd like it to say?

I have no hesitation in applying a law regardless of what I might think about it; I think any good judge recognizes his or her place in our constitutional government, and that place is not to upset the will of the people as expressed through their elected representatives. So, I do not have any compunction about following the law as written by Congress.

I listened to a panel of judges and I'll comment on that — I will not comment on the statements made by, um, certainly one judge — but I have to be honest that if these judges wanted to, in my opinion, help the court, in terms of respect for the court, they'd do what they should be doing. I mean it's so sad, they should be, you know, when you read something so simple, and so beautifully written, and so perfectly written — other than the one statement, of course, having to do with "he" or "she" — but when you read something so perfectly written, and so clear to anybody, and then you have lawyers and you watched, I watched last night in amazement, and I heard things that I couldn't believe, things that really had nothing to do with what I just read, and I don't ever want to call a court biased, so I won't call it biased, and we haven't had a decision yet, but courts seem to be so political, and it would be so great for our justice system if they would be able to read a statement and do what's right.

When in the fall of 2004 Chief Justice William Rehnquist fell ill with thyroid cancer, his condition set off months of conjecture over his potential replacement. Antonin Scalia's name was at the center of the speculation. On the Supreme Court for almost eighteen years, Scalia had become the intellectual leader of legal conservatives. Law students and professors- the like-minded but even many who disagreed with him- devoured his legal opinions. Of the nine sitting justices, he was most often the subject of academic law review articles. He had a celebrity quality that drew standing-room-only crowds to his appearances on college campuses. And he was held up as a model justice by President George W. Bush, who would be the one deciding on a new chief justice if Rehnquist retired.
Yet Scalia was also the Court's contrarian. The speculation on Rehnquist's replacement turned on the question: Could a justice whose views of the Constitution harked back two centuries, and who routinely lost the votes of his colleagues become chief justice of the United States? Within the decorous chambers, Scalia was notorious for pushing away other justices at critical points in the decision-making process. In a close case, when he was barely holding on to a majority, he could not resist brash comments that might alienate a key vote. When he was in dissent, he did not go quietly. On critical points of law he declared that his colleagues' opinions "cannot be taken seriously"; were "beyond the absurd"; and should be considered "nothing short of preposterous." In June 2004, a few months before Rehnquist revealed the cancer, the Court ruled that the execution of mentally retarded convicts violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Scalia, in dissent, blasted the majority: "Seldom has an opinion of this Court rested so obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its members."

Justice Antonin Scalia fundamentally changed the way the Supreme Court interpreted both statutes and the Constitution. In both contexts, his focus on text and its original public meaning often translated into more limited criminal prohibitions and broader constitutional protections for defendants. ‎As to statutes, Justice Scalia refocused the court’s attention on the text of the laws Congress enacted. Although he may not have succeeded in getting the court to forswear even looking at legislative history, he did persuade his colleagues to start — and very often end — the analysis with the text. In the criminal context, he limited terms like extortion and property to their common law core and found the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act as unconstitutionally vague as “the phrase ‘fire-engine red, light pink, maroon, navy blue, or colors that otherwise involve shades of red.” When it came to interpreting the Constitution, he likewise put the text first and emphasized that the terms must be understood in light of their original public meaning. He believed that the words should be understood the way the framers used them. This did not mean that constitutional protections were frozen in time.

There may be cases in which there is so much of difficulty in knowing where the law stands that we take time to consider, and sometimes doubt much and sometimes differ among ourselves. But I believe every one of the Judges acts upon the principle that he is before man and God in the discharge of his duty, and acts upon his solemn oath, and declares tbe law not according to any political fancy, or for the purposes of serving one party or serving another, but according to the pure conviction of his own mind without looking to any party.

Because these two judges showed to their generation of justices, and the generation after that, as to how to approach cases that came before the highest court. It is because judges with a political or social agenda are so few in number that they are long remembered. I have always considered it significant and beneficial for the development of the law in India that judges-without-an-agenda have been the more numerous.

My philosophy has been and continues to be that [the Court] cannot and should not try to seize the initiative in shaping the policy of the law, either by constitutional interpretation or by statutory construction. While the line to be drawn between interpretation and legislation is difficult, and numerous dissents turn upon it, there is a limit beyond which the Court incurs the just charge of trying to supersede the law-making branches. Every Justice has been accused of legislating and every one has joined in that accusation of others. When the Court has gone too far, it has provoked reactions which have set back the cause it is designed to advance and has sometimes called down upon itself severe rebuke.