Property systems are in general not completely self-enforcing. They depend for their definition upon a constellation of legal procedures, both civil … - Kenneth Arrow

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Property systems are in general not completely self-enforcing. They depend for their definition upon a constellation of legal procedures, both civil and criminal. The course of the law itself cannot be regarded as subject to the price system. The judges and the police may indeed be paid, but the system itself would disappear if on each occasion they were to sell their services and decisions. Thus the definition of property rights based on the price system depends precisely on the lack of universality of private property and of the price system. This ties in with the third hypothesis put forward in section I. The price system is not, and perhaps in some basic sense cannot be, universal. To the extent that it is incomplete, it must be supplemented by an implicit or explicit social contract. Thus one might loosely say that the categorical imperative and the price system are essential complements.

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About Kenneth Arrow

Kenneth Joseph Arrow (August 23, 1921 – February 21, 2017) was an American economist, who was Professor Emeritus of Economics in Stanford, and joint winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with John Hicks in 1972.

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Birth Name: Kenneth Joseph Arrow
Alternative Names: Kenneth J. Arrow Ken Arrow
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Additional quotes by Kenneth Arrow

The businessman may be compared with two other types of individuals who are essentially concerned with behavior under uncertainty ― the scientist and the statistician. The scientist must choose, on the basis of limited information, among the innumerable logically conceivable laws of nature, a limited number. He cannot know whether his decisions are right or wrong, and, indeed, it is none too clear what is meant by those terms. There is a long history of attempts to reduce scientific method to system, including many which introduce probability theory, but it cannot be said that any great formal success has attended these efforts. If we were to compare the businessman to the scientist, we would be forced to the melancholy conclusion that little of a systematic nature can be said about the former’s decision-making processes.
The statistician typically finds himself in situations more similar to that of the businessman. The problem of statistics can be formulated roughly as follows. It is known that one out of a number of hypotheses about a given situation is true. The statistician has the choice of one of a number of different experiments (a series of experiments can be regarded as a single experiment, so that drawing a sample of any size can be included in this schema), the outcome of any one of which is a random variable with a probability distribution depending on which of the unknown hypotheses is correct. On the basis of that outcome, the statistician must take some action (accept or reject a hypothesis, estimate the mean of a distribution to be some particular value, accept or reject a lot of goods, recommend a change in production methods, and so on), the consequences of which depend on the action taken and on the hypothesis that is actually true.

There is no need to enlarge upon the importance of a realistic theory explaining how individuals choose among alternate courses of action when the consequences of their actions are incompletely known to them. It is no exaggeration to say that every choice made by human beings would meet this description if attention were paid to the ultimate implications.

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