I was convinced before the war started that it was a great disaster, a great wrong. Even after the campaign in Poland my conviction didn't change bec… - Walter Warlimont

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I was convinced before the war started that it was a great disaster, a great wrong. Even after the campaign in Poland my conviction didn't change because on 3rd September, the third day of our going to war, the Western Powers had declared war on Germany. After the campaign in France in 1940 my conviction became uncertain, but when I heard one or two months after the armistice with France that now Hitler was to go with Russia, the old conviction came up again and it was at this moment that I changed the place of living for my family, moved them from Berlin to the place where they are today.

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About Walter Warlimont

Walter Warlimont (October 3, 1894 – October 9, 1976) was a German staff officer during World War II. He served as deputy chief of the Operations Staff, one of the departments in the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), the Armed Forces High Command. Following the war, Warlimont was convicted in the High Command Trial and sentenced to life imprisonment as a war criminal. He was released in 1954.

Also Known As

Alternative Names: W. Warlimont
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Additional quotes by Walter Warlimont

1. Political officials and leaders are to be liquidated. 2. Insofar as they are captured by the troops, an officer with authority to impose disciplinary punishment decides whether the given individual must be liquidated. For such a decision the fact suffices that he is a political official. 3. Political leaders in the troops (Red Army) are not recognized as prisoners of war and are to be liquidated at the latest in the prisoner-of-war transit camps.

If one looks back at the short period of time of the Badoglio government, one must remember that the Italian longing and need for peace was no secret to the German command. Since the German retreat at el Alamein in November 1942 and the collapse of the Italian Army on the eastern front, the Italians had repeatedly stated their weariness of battle and had made certain suggestions. In steadily increasing numbers, measures were being taken by the German military command out of fear for the Axis loyalty of Italy. As the course of events showed, the view on betrayal dominated all other German reflections, nourished by the fall of Mussolini and his style of leadership.

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