If people did not sometimes do silly things, nothing intelligent would ever get done. - Ludwig Wittgenstein

First, there is the problem what actually occurs in our minds when we use language with the intention of meaning something by it; this problem belongs to psychology. Secondly, there is the problem as to what is the relation subsisting between thoughts, words, or sentences, and that which they refer to or mean; this problem belongs to epistemology. Thirdly, there is the problem of using sentences so as to convey truth rather than falsehood; this belongs to the special sciences dealing with the subject-matter of the sentences in question. Fourthly, there is the question: what relation must one fact (such as a sentence) have to another in order to be capable of being a symbol for that other? This last is a logical question,

Bad philosophers are like slum landlords. It's my job to put them out of business.

"Facts which are not compounded of other facts are what Mr Wittgenstein calls Sachverhalle, whereas a fact which may consist of two or more facts is called a Tatsache: thus, for example, "Socrates is wise " is a Sachverhalt, as well as a Tatsache, whereas "Socrates is wise and Plato is his pupil" is a Tatsache but not a Sachverhalt.
He compares"