And that is the real force of my earlier insistence on empiricism. My brand of empiricism does not insist that we must have fully compelling grounds … - John Dupré

Faith is, I suppose, a rough synonym for belief, with an additional connotation that this belief is not grounded on anything. This is a difficult concept to take seriously from a philosophical point of view. Obviously if one has it, one finds it convincing. If one doesn’t, it’s hard to know how to understand the conviction, since no reasons can be offered for it. The difficulty is exacerbated by the variety of objects of faith that are on offer. How does one decide whether to be more impressed by the convinced Christian or the convinced Muslim? Or, for that matter, the person equally convinced of the healing powers of crystals or that faith can move mountains? If there are no reasons for adopting these systems of belief, it seem impossible for there to be any reason for choosing between them. My own response is, I hardly need say, not to take very seriously. It is one thing to admit that our knowledge of the universe is extremely limited, but a counsel of despair to respond to this by believing whatever we feel like.

Empiricism provides the standard to which beliefs should answer. If we are capable of finding out what kind of world we live in, surely the best way of doing so is through our experience of it.

Religious difference, arguably, remains the most effective basis for defending boundaries between them and us, and the withering away of this kind of mythology would, I think, be entirely salutary. This is to say nothing of the thought that it may well be better for people to believe what is true.