In Plato's Republic, when the interlocutor of Socrates appears to bring certain plausible reasons to bear upon the mathematical sciences, to show tha… - Nicomachus

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In Plato's Republic, when the interlocutor of Socrates appears to bring certain plausible reasons to bear upon the mathematical sciences, to show that they are useful to human life, arithmetic for reckoning, distributions, contributions, exchanges, and partnerships, geometry for sieges, the founding of cities and sanctuaries, and the partition of land, music for festivals, entertainment, and the worship of the gods, and the doctrine of the spheres, or astronomy, for farming, navigation and other undertakings, revealing beforehand the proper procedure and suitable season, Socrates, reproaching him says: "You amuse me, because you seem to fear that these are useless studies that I recommend; but that is very difficult, nay, impossible. For the eye of the soul, blinded and buried by other pursuits, is rekindled and aroused again by these and these alone, and it is better that this be saved than thousands of bodily eyes, for by it alone is the truth of the universe beheld."

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About Nicomachus

, or Nicomachus of Gerasa, (Greek: Νικόμαχος; c. 60 – c. 120 CE) was an important ancient Greek mathematician best known for and Manual of Harmonics. He was born in , in the Roman province of Syria (now , ). Although a Neopythagorean who wrote about the mystical properties of numbers, Nicomachus was strongly influenced by Aristotle.

Also Known As

Native Name: Νικόμαχος Γερασηνός
Alternative Names: Nicomachus of Gerasa

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Additional quotes by Nicomachus

Things... are some of them continuous...which are properly and peculiarly called 'magnitudes'; others are discontinuous, in a side-by-side arrangement, and, as it were, in heaps, which are called 'multitudes,' a flock, for instance, a people, a heap, a chorus, and the like.
Wisdom, then, must be considered to be the knowledge of these two forms. Since, however, all multitude and magnitude are by their own nature of necessity infinite—for multitude starts from a definite root and never ceases increasing; and magnitude, when division beginning with a limited whole is carried on, cannot bring the dividing process to an end... and since sciences are always sciences of limited things, and never of infinites, it is accordingly evident that a science dealing with magnitude... or with multitude... could never be formulated.... A science, however, would arise to deal with something separated from each of them, with quantity, set off from multitude, and size, set off from magnitude.

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