[E]verything that we're going to do is some approximation of Solomonoff Induction. ...[O]ur concepts cannot really refer to facts in the world out th… - Joscha Bach

[T]he types of models that we form right now are not sparse enough... which means that, ideally, every potential model state should correspond to a potential world state. So... if you vary states in your model, you always end up with valid world states. ...[O]ur mind is not quite there... an indication is especially what we see in dreams. The older we get, the more boring our dreams become, because we incorporate more and more constraints that we learned about how the world works. So many of the things that we imagine to be possible as children turn out to be constrained by physical and social dynamics, and as a result fewer and fewer things remain possible. It's not because our imagination scales back, but the constraints under which it operates become tighter and tighter. ...So the constraints under which our neural networks operate are almost limitless, which means it's very difficult to get a neural network to imagine things that look real.

[N]egligence of internal states of the mind makes it difficult to form conclusive theories of cognition, especially with regard to language... and consciousness, so radical behaviorism... lost its foothold. Yet, methodological behaviorism is still prevalent...

Computation is different. Computation can exist. It starts with an initial state, and then you have a transition function. You do the work. You apply the transition function [and] you get into the next state. Computation is always finite.