Our understanding is a faculty of concepts, i.e., a discursive understanding, for which it must of course be contingent what and how different might … - Immanuel Kant

Il difetto di giudizio è propriamente quello che si chiama stupidità, difetto cui non c'è modo di arrecare rimedio. Una testa ottusa o limitata, alla quale non manchi altro che un conveniente grado di intelletto […], si può ben armare mediante l'insegnamento fino a farne magari un dotto. Ma, poiché in tal caso di solito avviene che sia sempre in difetto di giudizio […], non è raro il caso di uomini assai dotti, i quali nell'uso della loro scienza lasciano spesso scorgere quel tal difetto, che non si lascia mai correggere.

Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Nothing is required for this enlightenment except freedom; and the freedom in question is the least harmful of all, namely, the freedom to use with and publicly in all matters.

Two things fill the mind with every new and increasing wonder and awe, the oftener and the more steadily I reflect upon them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me. I do not merely conjecture them and seek them as if they were obscured in darkness or in the transcendent region beyond my horizon: I see them before me, and I connect them directly with the consciousness of my own existence. The starry heavens begin at the place I occupy in the external world of sense, and they broaden the connection in which I stand into an unbounded magnitude of worlds beyond worlds and systems of systems and into the limitless times of their periodic motion, their beginning and duration. The latter begins at my invisible self, my personality, and exhibits me in a world which has true infinity but which only the understanding can trace - a world in which I recognise myself as existing in a universal and necessary ( and not, as in the first case, only contingent) connection, and thereby also in connection with all those visible worlds. The former view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates, as it were, my importance as an 'animal creature' which must give back to the planet (a mere speck in the universe) the matter fro which it came, matter which is for a little time endowed with vital force, we know not how. The latter, on the contrary, infinitely raises my worth as that of an 'intelligence' by my being a person in whom the moral law reveals to me a life independent of all animality and even of the whole world of sense, at least so far as it may be inferred from the final destination assigned to my existence by this law, a destination which is not restricted to the conditions and boundaries of this life but reaches into the infinite.