“Jihad,” the Koranic concept of total strategy…[d]emands the preparation and application of total national power and military instrument is one of it… - S. K. Malik

In an article pertaining to the evolution of strategic thought, Harry L. Coles expresses the view that the history of strategy can be divided into two-time groups: the pre-1945 time-group during which strategy suffered from under think; and the post-1945 period in which it has been suffering from the opposite malady—the over-think. The climax of the pre-1945 strategic thought was the discovery that the decision should be sought in the psychological dimensions of war. With the advent of the nuclear bomb in the post-1945 period, the theory of strategy has, after passing through several evolutionary stages eventually come to be dominated by 'deterrence'.

Preparation must be 'to the utmost', both in quality and in quantity. It must be continuous and never ending process. Preparation should be at the plane of total strategy, that is, Jehad, and not of the military instrument alone. Military preparedness will yield the desired results only if it forms a part of the total preparedness. Quantitative preparation may have its physical limitations but qualitative preparation is limited only by our will and energy to acquire it. The lesser the physical resource, the greater must be the stress and reliance on the spiritual dimensions of war. The operational effectiveness of a fighting force depends upon its total strength: physical as well as spiritual. An army might be inferior in one field but should be superior to the opponent in the aggregate. the side that is inferior in the physical strength can draw on its spiritual strength to acquire a higher degree of aggregate strength. Physical strength must, however, be prepared for and applied 'to the utmost'. Physical preparedness is complimentary to spiritual preparedness and vice versa; none can compensate or intercede for the other. Terror struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means, it is the end in itself. Once a condition of terror into the opponent's heart is obtained, hardly anything is left to be achieved. It is the point where the means and the end meet and merge. Terror is not a means of imposing decision upon the enemy; it is the decision we wish to impose upon him. Psychological and physical dislocation is, at best, a means, though, by no mens, conclusive for striking terror into the hearts of the enemies. Its effects are related to the physical and spiritual stamina of the opponent but are seldom of a permanent and lasting nature. An army that practices the Quranic philosophy of war in its totality is immune to psychological pressures. When Lindell Hart talks of imposing a direct decision upon the enemy through psychological dislocation alone, he is taking too much for granted.

The first step... is to understand the difference between total strategy, that is Jehad, and military strategy. The term, Jehad, so often confused with military strategy, is, in fact, the near-equivalent of total or grand strategy or policy in execution. Jehad entails the comprehensive direction and application of ‘power’ while military strategy deals only with the preparation for and application of force. Jehad is a continuous and never-ending struggle waged on all fronts including political, economic, social, psychological, domestic, moral and spiritual to attain the object of policy. It aims at attaining the overall mission assigned to the Islamic State, and military strategy is one of the means available to it to do so. It is waged at the individual as well as collective level; and at internal as well as external front. Waged in its true spirit, and with multiple means available to it, the Islamic concept of total strategy has the capacity to produce direct results. Alternately, however, it creates conditions conducive to the military strategy to attain its objectives speedily and economically. Military strategy thus draws heavily on the total strategy (Jehad) for its successful application. Any weakness or strength in the formulation, direction or application of the total strategy would affect military strategy in like manner. In the absence of Jehad, the preparation for and application of ‘force’ to its best advantage would be a matter of exception, not rule. Conversely, optimum preparation and application of military instrument forms an integral part of Jehad.