To die proudly when it is no longer possible to live proudly. Death of one's own free choice, death at the proper time, with a clear head and with jo… - Friedrich Nietzsche

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Engraved portrait of Friedrich Nietzsche, facing right

To die proudly when it is no longer possible to live proudly. Death of one's own free choice, death at the proper time, with a clear head and with joyfulness, consummated in the midst of children and witnesses: so that an actual leave-taking is possible while he who is leaving is still there

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About Friedrich Nietzsche

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (15 October 1844 – 25 August 1900) was a German philosopher, cultural critic, composer, poet, writer, and philologist whose work has exerted a profound influence on modern intellectual history. His critiques of contemporary culture, religion, and philosophy centered on a basic question regarding the foundation of values and morality.

Biography information from Wikiquote · Portrait adapted from Wikimedia Commons, Friedrich Hermann Hartmann (Public domain / CC0)

Also Known As

Alternative Names: Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche Nietzsche

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Additional quotes by Friedrich Nietzsche

"Nothing is needed more than truth, and in relation to it everything else has only second-rate value."

This unconditional will to truth — what is it? Is it the will not to allow oneself to be deceived? Or is it the will not to deceive? For the will to truth could be interpreted in the second way, too — if only the special case "I do not want to deceive myself" is subsumed under the generalization "I do not want to deceive." But why not deceive?

But why not allow oneself to be deceived?

Note that the reasons for the former principle belong to an altogether different realm from those for the second. One does not want to allow oneself to be deceived because one assumes that it is harmful, dangerous, calamitous to be deceived. In this sense, science would be a long-range prudence, a caution, a utility; but one could object in all fairness: How is that? Is wanting not to allow oneself to be deceived really less harmful, less dangerous, less calamitous? What do you know in advance of the character of existence to be able to decide whether the greater advantage is on the side of the unconditionally mistrustful or of the unconditionally trusting?

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