...[M]an and generally any rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all … - Immanuel Kant

Man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will: he must in all his actions, whether they are directed to himself or to other rational beings, always be viewed at the same time as an end.

Now I say: man and generally any rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or other rational beings, must always be regarded at the same time as an end.

The sham cause in physical influence consists in rashly assuming that the commerce of substance and transitive forces is sufficiently knowable from their mere existence. Hence it is not so much a system as rather the neglect of all philosophical system as a superfluity in the argument. Freeing the concept from this defect, we shall have a species of commerce alone deserving to be called real, and from which the whole constituting the world merits being called real, and not ideal or imaginary.

Il difetto di giudizio è propriamente quello che si chiama stupidità, difetto cui non c'è modo di arrecare rimedio. Una testa ottusa o limitata, alla quale non manchi altro che un conveniente grado di intelletto […], si può ben armare mediante l'insegnamento fino a farne magari un dotto. Ma, poiché in tal caso di solito avviene che sia sempre in difetto di giudizio […], non è raro il caso di uomini assai dotti, i quali nell'uso della loro scienza lasciano spesso scorgere quel tal difetto, che non si lascia mai correggere.

As the analysis of a substantial composite terminates only in a part which is not a whole, that is, in a simple part, so synthesis terminates only in a whole which is not a part, that is, the world.