C'est quasi le même de conserver avec ceux des autres siècles que de voyager. - René Descartes

ART. 17. The functions of the soul Having thus considered all the functions that pertain to the body alone, it is easy to recognize that there remains nothing in us that we should ascribe to the soul except our thoughts, of which there are two main kinds: the actions of the soul and its passions. By its actions I mean all our volitions, since we experience these as coming directly from our soul, and as apparently depending on it alone. Whereas, on the other hand, the term ‘passions’ can be applied in general to all the kinds of perception or knowledge to be found within us, because it is often not our soul that makes them what they are, and because they are always produced in us by the things they represent.

Zira bilimlerin hepsi insan bilgeliğinden (humana sapientia) başka bir şey değildir ve nasıl ki şeylerin çeşit çeşit olması, onları aydınlatan güneşin doğasında bir fark yaratmıyorsa, akıl da ne kadar farklı konuyla ilgilenirse ilgilensin hep bir ve aynı kalır. Dolayısıyla insan aklının herhangi bir sınırlamaya ihtiyacı yoktur. Bir doğrunun bilinmesi, bir sanatı edinmenin bir diğerini edinmeyi engellemesi gibi değildir; başka bir doğrunun bilinmesine engel olmasının aksine bu konuda bize yardımcı bile olur.

The whole force of the argument rests on the fact that I recognize that it would be impossible for me to exist, being of such a
nature as I am (namely, having in me the idea of God), unless God did
in fact exist. God, I say, that same being the idea of whom is in me: a
being having all those perfections that I cannot comprehend, but can
somehow touch with my thought, and a being subject to no defects
whatever. From these considerations it is quite obvious that he cannot be
a deceiver, for it is manifest by the light of nature that all fraud and
deception depend on some defect