He had always given it as his opinion, that the restrictive system of commerce in this country was founded in error, and calculated to defeat the obj… - F. J. Robinson, 1st Viscount Goderich

Indeed, it would have been impossible for me to have supported a Corn Law as a part of a great system of national policy intended to give uniform and universal protection to native industry, because over and over again I have laid down the opposite principle with reference to protection; and I have shared year after year in measures and arguments, the object of which was to break in the principle of what is called protection to British industry, and to get rid, as speedily as circumstances would permit, first of prohibition, and then of protection, which I have always held to be injurious not only to the country generally, but ultimately to the very interests which it is designed to serve.

They were not now in the situation of arguing, for the first time, whether they should act on the principle of restriction or not. For not only on the subject of corn, but on all great branches of trade in this country, they had, from time immemorial, proceeded on a system of restriction. And therefore, he contended, they were not now placed in a situation of discussing first principles. They were not now, for the first time, to inquire, whether they were to act on this principle or not. The system had been acted on for a long period, and we could not depart from it without encountering a frightful revulsion, which it would be dreadful to combat. It was not, therefore, a question between restriction and non-restriction—but how they were to apply principles, that had been long called into action, to the existing circumstances of the country. This was the only ground on which he would now recommend the measure he was about to submit to their consideration.

When I introduced, in 1815, the Corn Bill of that day, I did it...with the greatest reluctance. I was not a Member of the Government; that is to say, I only held a subordinate situation in it—and when the Earl of Liverpool sent to desire that I would move the measure, I took the liberty of expressing to him that I had a great objection to the principle of any Corn Law whatever. I thought then—I have thought ever since—that a Corn Law is in itself an evil to be justified solely by the establishment of some paramount necessity, sufficient to overcome the magnitude of the objection, and to sanction the imposition on the country of what is in itself an evil.