The Holy Quran spelt out the object of the against Paganism soon after it commanded the muslims to take recourse to fighting. "And fight them on," ru… - S. K. Malik

Talking of Bard, the Holy Quran addresses the Prophet of Islam (peace be upon him), "Remember, thy Lord inspired the angels (with the message), 'I am with you: give firmness to the Believers: I will instill terror into the hearts of the Unbelievers." Again in the battle of Ohad, the Book identified the causes of the Muslims defeat and provided them divine guidance about their future course of action. Should the Muslims observe the divine code of conduct prescribed for them, the Book held out a promise, saying, "Soon shall We cast terror into the hearts of the Unbelievers." On the question of instilling terror into the hearts of the enemies, a reference is also available in Sura 'Ahzab', pertaining to the battle of Khandaq. "And those of the people of the Book who aided them," the Holy Quran referred to the treachery of Banu Quraiza, "Allah did take them down from their strongholds and cast terror into their hearts, (so that) sum ye slew, ans some ye made prisoners. And he made you heirs of their lands, their houses, and their goods, and of a land which ye had not frequented (before). And Allah has power over all things." We see that, on all these occasions, when God wishes to impose His will upon His enemies, He choses to do so by casting terror into their hearts. But, what strategy does He prescribe for the Believers to enforce their decision upon their foes? "Let not the Unbelievers think," God commands us directly and pointedly, "that they can get the better (of the Godly): they will never frustrate them. Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies of Allah and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know."

With the invention of the atomic weapons, there appeared, between 1945 and 1955, a class of strategists who looked upon the nuclear bomb as the 'absolute' weapon of war. Accordingly, they formulated the theory of the strategy of , best described by the similitude of 'two scorpions in a bottle', a metaphor coined by J. Robert Oppenheimer. With further developments in nuclear bombs and greater knowledge of their effects came Dulles' theory of massive nuclear retaliation enunciated in 1954 and Mcnamara's flexible response. This was followed by other schools of thought hovering round graduated deterrence, second strike capability and the oceanic system. In 1959, denounced the theory of the 'balance of terror'. His thesis was that a deterrent force existed only if it was capable of inflicting reprisals. He laid down a set of six conditions for a second strike capability and came to conclude that the United States possessed none of them at that time. Dr. Henry Kissinger, in his famous book, 'Necessity for Choice' embraced the new gospel of s and introduced the element of 'credibility' to 'deterrence'. "Deterrence," he wrote, "requires a combination of power, the will to use it, and the assessment of these by the potential aggressor." Since 1960, deterrence has dominated the realm of strategy in one from or the other; it has been variously described as active and passive; offensive and defensive; direct and indirect; relative and total or absolute; positive and negative; limited and general; counter-force and counter-city, and so on.

When Clausewitz, the founder-father of modern military thought, defined war as a 'continuation of policy by other means', he did, in fact, throw a challenge to the students of Political Science and International Relations to develop a theory around 'policy'. Clasewitz thus put the cart before the horse and forced the policy-makers to conduct deeper research into the science of politics. It was not 'policy' that took the initiative to define the meaning, sphere, limites and extents of 'war'. On the contrary, 'war' forced 'policy' to define and determine its own parameters. It took the human mind hundreds of years to establish, if at all, the relationship between national aims and objectives, national interests, national policy and war; and even longer to realise that war was subservient to policy. Nonetheless, the political scientists did rise to the occasion to theorise; they opined that, in brief, policy was the pursuit of national interests and that war became an instrument of policy when vital but incompatible national interests were at stake. What they failed to establish, however, was concerning the rationale behind the determination of national interests.