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When Clausewitz, the founder-father of modern military thought, defined war as a 'continuation of policy by other means', he did, in fact, throw a ch… - S. K. Malik
" "When Clausewitz, the founder-father of modern military thought, defined war as a 'continuation of policy by other means', he did, in fact, throw a challenge to the students of Political Science and International Relations to develop a theory around 'policy'. Clasewitz thus put the cart before the horse and forced the policy-makers to conduct deeper research into the science of politics. It was not 'policy' that took the initiative to define the meaning, sphere, limites and extents of 'war'. On the contrary, 'war' forced 'policy' to define and determine its own parameters. It took the human mind hundreds of years to establish, if at all, the relationship between national aims and objectives, national interests, national policy and war; and even longer to realise that war was subservient to policy. Nonetheless, the political scientists did rise to the occasion to theorise; they opined that, in brief, policy was the pursuit of national interests and that war became an instrument of policy when vital but incompatible national interests were at stake. What they failed to establish, however, was concerning the rationale behind the determination of national interests.
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About S. K. Malik
(born 1930) was a soldier and officer of the (Brigadier General, later Major General). He was a protege of General Muhammed Zia-ul-Haq (1924-1988), the chief of staff of the Pakistan Army, who ruled Pakistan between 1977 and 1988.
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Additional quotes by S. K. Malik
The Quranic philosophy of war is immensely rich in its moral and humanitarian contents. The Book prohibits the Muslims from transgressing the divine limits during the conduct of war. It forbids them from practising the stage and inhuman ways and methods of warfare practised during the Days of Ignorance. Though permitted to follow the Law of Equality and Reciprocity in their dealings with their enemies, the Faithfull are always counselled to prefer restraint and tolerance. Within its permissible purpose and limits, the book does not visualise war being waged with 'kid gloves'. It hives us a distinctive concept of . It wants both, the nation and the individual, to be at war 'in toto', that is, with all their spiritual, moral and physical resources. The Holy Quran lays the highest emphasis on the preparation for war. It wants us to prepare ourselves for war to the utmost. The test of utmost preparation lies in our capability to instill terror into the hearts of the enemies. The ability to strike terror into the enemy or to withstand the enemy attempts to terrorise us are ultimately linked with the strength of our Faith. Practised in their totality, the Quranic dimensions of war provide complete protection to the Muslim armies against any psychological breakdown. On the contrary, weaknesses in our Faith offer inroads to the enemy to launch successful psychological attacks against us. It is on the strength of our Faith, and the weakness of that of our adversary, that we can initiate plans and actions calculated to strike terror into the hearts of our adversaries.
Preparation must be 'to the utmost', both in quality and in quantity. It must be continuous and never ending process. Preparation should be at the plane of total strategy, that is, Jehad, and not of the military instrument alone. Military preparedness will yield the desired results only if it forms a part of the total preparedness. Quantitative preparation may have its physical limitations but qualitative preparation is limited only by our will and energy to acquire it. The lesser the physical resource, the greater must be the stress and reliance on the spiritual dimensions of war. The operational effectiveness of a fighting force depends upon its total strength: physical as well as spiritual. An army might be inferior in one field but should be superior to the opponent in the aggregate. the side that is inferior in the physical strength can draw on its spiritual strength to acquire a higher degree of aggregate strength. Physical strength must, however, be prepared for and applied 'to the utmost'. Physical preparedness is complimentary to spiritual preparedness and vice versa; none can compensate or intercede for the other. Terror struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means, it is the end in itself. Once a condition of terror into the opponent's heart is obtained, hardly anything is left to be achieved. It is the point where the means and the end meet and merge. Terror is not a means of imposing decision upon the enemy; it is the decision we wish to impose upon him. Psychological and physical dislocation is, at best, a means, though, by no mens, conclusive for striking terror into the hearts of the enemies. Its effects are related to the physical and spiritual stamina of the opponent but are seldom of a permanent and lasting nature. An army that practices the Quranic philosophy of war in its totality is immune to psychological pressures. When Lindell Hart talks of imposing a direct decision upon the enemy through psychological dislocation alone, he is taking too much for granted.
This book brings out with simplicity, clarity and precision the Quranic philosophy on the application of military force within the context of the totality that is Jihād. The professional soldier in a Muslim army, pursuing the goals of a Muslim state, cannot become “professional” if in all his activities he does not take the “colour of Allah.” The nonmilitary citizen of a Muslin state must, likewise, be aware of the kind of soldier that his country must produce and the only pattern of war that his country’s armed forces may wage.
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