What then is the Quranic concept of military strategy? instructions pertaining to the divine theory on military strategy are found in the revelations… - S. K. Malik

Let us now make an attempt to study the Quranic concept of strategy. The first step to his study is to understand the difference between total strategy, that is Jehad, and . The term, Jehad, so often confused with military strategy, is in fact, the near-equivalent of total or or policy-in-execution. Jehad entails the comprehensive direction and application of 'power' while military strategy deals only with the preparation for and application of 'force'. Jehad is a continuous and never-ending struggle waged on all fronts including political, economic, social, psychological, domestic, moral and spiritual to attain the object of policy. It aims at attaining the overall mission assigned to the Islamic State, and military strategy is one of the means available to it to do so. It is waged at individual as well as collective level, and at internal as well as external fronts. Waged in its true spirit, and with multiple means available to it, the Islamic concept of total strategy has the capacity to produce direct results. Alternatively, however, it creates conditions conducive to the military strategy to attain its object speedily and economically. Military strategy thus draws heavily on the total strategy (Jehad) for its successful application. Any weakness or strength in the formulation, direction or application of the total strategy would affect military strategy in the like manner. In the absence of Jehad, the preparation for and application of 'force' to its best advantage would be matter of exception, not rule. Conversely, optimum preparation and application of the military instrument forms an integral part of Jehad.

In an article pertaining to the evolution of strategic thought, Harry L. Coles expresses the view that the history of strategy can be divided into two-time groups: the pre-1945 time-group during which strategy suffered from under think; and the post-1945 period in which it has been suffering from the opposite malady—the over-think. The climax of the pre-1945 strategic thought was the discovery that the decision should be sought in the psychological dimensions of war. With the advent of the nuclear bomb in the post-1945 period, the theory of strategy has, after passing through several evolutionary stages eventually come to be dominated by 'deterrence'.

Terror cannot be struck into the hearts of an army by merely cutting its lines of communication or depriving it of its routes of withdrawal. It is basically related to the strength or weakness of the human soul. It can be instilled only if the opponent's Faith is destroyed. Psychological dislocation can be produced by a physical act but this does not hold good of the spiritual dislocation. To instill terror into the hearts of the enemy, it is essential, in the ultimate analysis, to dislocate his faith. An invincible Faith is immune to terror. A weak Faith offers inroads to terror. The Faith conferred upon us by the Holy Quran has the inherent strength to ward off terror from us and to enable us to strike terror into the enemy, it must, in order to be effective be capable of striking terror into the hearts of the enemy. A strategy that fails to attain this condition suffers from inherent drawbacks and weaknesses; and should be reviewed and modified. This rule is fully applicable to nuclear as well as conventional wars. It is equally true of the strategy of nuclear deterrence in fashion today. To be credible and effective, the strategy of deterrence must be capable of striking terror into the hearts of the enemy.