In an article pertaining to the evolution of strategic thought, Harry L. Coles expresses the view that the history of strategy can be divided into tw… - S. K. Malik

With the invention of the atomic weapons, there appeared, between 1945 and 1955, a class of strategists who looked upon the nuclear bomb as the 'absolute' weapon of war. Accordingly, they formulated the theory of the strategy of , best described by the similitude of 'two scorpions in a bottle', a metaphor coined by J. Robert Oppenheimer. With further developments in nuclear bombs and greater knowledge of their effects came Dulles' theory of massive nuclear retaliation enunciated in 1954 and Mcnamara's flexible response. This was followed by other schools of thought hovering round graduated deterrence, second strike capability and the oceanic system. In 1959, denounced the theory of the 'balance of terror'. His thesis was that a deterrent force existed only if it was capable of inflicting reprisals. He laid down a set of six conditions for a second strike capability and came to conclude that the United States possessed none of them at that time. Dr. Henry Kissinger, in his famous book, 'Necessity for Choice' embraced the new gospel of s and introduced the element of 'credibility' to 'deterrence'. "Deterrence," he wrote, "requires a combination of power, the will to use it, and the assessment of these by the potential aggressor." Since 1960, deterrence has dominated the realm of strategy in one from or the other; it has been variously described as active and passive; offensive and defensive; direct and indirect; relative and total or absolute; positive and negative; limited and general; counter-force and counter-city, and so on.

“Jihad,” the Koranic concept of total strategy…[d]emands the preparation and application of total national power and military instrument is one of its elements. As a component of the total strategy, the military strategy aims at striking terror into the hearts of the enemy from the preparatory stage of war…. Under ideal conditions, Jihad can produce a direct decision and force its will upon the enemy. Where that does not happen, military strategy should take over and aim at producing the decision from the military stage. Should that chance be missed, terror should be struck into the enemy during the actual fighting. The Book [Koran] does not visualize war being waged with “kid gloves.” It gives us a distinctive concept of total war. It wants both, the nation and the individual, to be at war “in toto,” that is, with all their spiritual, moral, and physical resources. The Holy Koran lays the highest emphasis on the preparation for war. It wants us to prepare ourselves for war to the utmost. The test of utmost preparation lies in our capability to instill terror into the hearts of the enemies.

The that concluded the Second World War and formulated the Allied post-war strategy also came under heavy criticism for its inadequacy and short-sightedness. Like several other students of politics and war, General Fueller was also its vehement critic. His contention was that the Allied leaders had sacrificed the vital necessity of obtaining a durable peace at the altar of securing the unconditional surrender of Germany. The great military thinker had, however, no alternative of his own to suggest to them. As the Second World War came to a close, the Allied war effort also began to give way to their respective national interests. Each side, however, had its own interpretation of what constituted its interpretation of what constituted its enlightened national interests. Russia saw her interests in conquering the heart of Europe, the Allies, in the destruction of the German military might. The consideration of peace did weigh heavy on the minds of the nations of Europe whenever they developed the means to destroy one-another. Such an atmosphere prevailed after the conclusion of each devastating war and after the atomic explosion of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But, it did not last long. The Europeans soon came to realise that there did exist means of protection against weapons that were once looked upon as total and absolute. Once that happened, their baser and destructive elements again overtook the saner ones. Similar motives underline the present age of 'detente' and 'deterrence'. The considerations of peace come to human mind only when the choice is between 'suicide' and 'co-existence'. They are the by-products of exigency, not of a recognised or consistent policy or philosophy. They failed to stand the test of time in the past, nor are they resulting in durable global peace at present. Indeed, they have no worth while role to play in the future.