As in the case of individuals, so inter-state relationship, war could only be waged for the sake of justice, truth, law and preservation of human soc… - S. K. Malik

The Quranic philosophy of war is, for the better part, a philosophy of checks and restraints on the use of 'force' in interstate relations. The very Quranic command that directed the Muslims to go to war with the Pagans also bade them not to exceed limits. "Fight in the cause of Allah, those who fight you," it said, "but do not trangress limits; for Allah loveth not trangressors." Divine controls on war were imposed at all stages of the revelation of the Qurainc Message. For the first twelve years, the Muslims were called upon to put up with the atrocities, the Koraish perpetrated on them but hold back their hands from fighting. With the issuance of the divine command for fighting, were also specified the causes for which war could be entered upon. The Holy Quran also spelt out a clear and unmistakable object of war. The underlying theme behind the Quranic causes and object of war was the preservation and promotion of peace and justice.

When Clausewitz, the founder-father of modern military thought, defined war as a 'continuation of policy by other means', he did, in fact, throw a challenge to the students of Political Science and International Relations to develop a theory around 'policy'. Clasewitz thus put the cart before the horse and forced the policy-makers to conduct deeper research into the science of politics. It was not 'policy' that took the initiative to define the meaning, sphere, limites and extents of 'war'. On the contrary, 'war' forced 'policy' to define and determine its own parameters. It took the human mind hundreds of years to establish, if at all, the relationship between national aims and objectives, national interests, national policy and war; and even longer to realise that war was subservient to policy. Nonetheless, the political scientists did rise to the occasion to theorise; they opined that, in brief, policy was the pursuit of national interests and that war became an instrument of policy when vital but incompatible national interests were at stake. What they failed to establish, however, was concerning the rationale behind the determination of national interests.

In his penetrating war, 'Strategy: The Indirect Approach,' Liddell Hart Made an attempt to epitomize, from the history of war, a few truths of experience which seemed to him so universal and fundamental as to be termed 'axioms.' According to him, the maxims applied to tactics as well as strategy alike. The great military think came to the general conclusion that all the principles of war could be concentrated into one single principle, that is, concentration of strength against weakness. To apply this principle, he put forward eight rules, six positive and two negative. The positive rules were: the maintenance of the aim; the adjustment of the means to the end; the adoption of the line of least expectation and resistance; the undertaking of a line of operation that threatened multiple objectives; and ensuring that plans and dispositions were flexible and adaptable to the circumstances. In the negative rules, he advocated that all the weight should not be thrown in one stroke while the enemy was on guard, and that an attack, once failed, should not be resumed along the same lines or in the same form.