A man shouldn’t claim to know even himself as he really is by knowing himself through inner sensation — i.e. by introspection. For since he doesn’t p… - Immanuel Kant

" "

A man shouldn’t claim to know even himself as he really is by knowing himself through inner sensation — i.e. by introspection. For since he doesn’t produce himself (so to speak) or get his concept of himself a priori but only empirically, it is natural that he gets his knowledge of himself through inner sense and consequently only through how his nature appears and how his consciousness is affected. But beyond the character of his own subject, which is made up out of these mere appearances, he necessarily assumes something else underlying it, namely his I as it is in itself. Thus in respect to mere perception and receptivity to sensations he must count himself as belonging to the sensible world; but in respect to whatever pure activity there may be in himself (which reaches his consciousness directly and not by affecting the inner or outer senses) he must count himself as belonging to the intellectual world — though he doesn’t know anything more about it.