Unlimited Quote Collections
Organize your favorite quotes without limits. Create themed collections for every occasion with Premium.
We can regard the vector c<sub>i</sub> as representing certain physical, social, and psychological attributes of player i himself in that it summariz… - John Harsanyi
" "We can regard the vector c<sub>i</sub> as representing certain physical, social, and psychological attributes of player i himself in that it summarizes some crucial parameters of player i's own payoff function U<sub>i</sub> as well as the main parameters of his beliefs about his social and physical environment... the rules of the game as such allow any given player i to belong to any one of a number of possible types, corresponding to the alternative values of his attribute vector c i could take... Each player is assumed to know his own actual type but to be in general ignorant about the other players' actual types.
English
Collect this quote
About John Harsanyi
John Charles Harsanyi (May 29, 1920 – August 9, 2000) was a Hungarian economist, best known for his contributions to the study of game theory and economic reasoning in political and moral philosophy as well as contributing to the study of equilibrium selection. For his work, he was a co-recipient along with John Nash and Reinhard Selten of the 1994 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics.
Also Known As
Native Name:
John Charles Harsanyi
Related quotes. More quotes will automatically load as you scroll down, or you can use the load more buttons.
Additional quotes by John Harsanyi
In November 1944 the Nazi authorities finally decided to deport my labor unit from Budapest to an Austrian concentration camp, where most of my comrades eventually perished. But I was lucky enough to make my escape from the railway station in Budapest, just before our train left for Austria. Then a Jesuit father I had known gave me refuge in the cellar of their monastery.
Works in ChatGPT, Claude, or Any AI
Add semantic quote search to your AI assistant via MCP. One command setup.
The paper develops a new theory for the analysis of games with incomplete information where the players are uncertain about some important parameters of the game situation, such as the payoff functions, the strategies available to various players, the information other players have about the game, etc. However, each player has a subjective probability distribution over the alternative possibilities.
In most of the paper it is assumed that these probability distributions entertained by the different players are mutually "consistent," in the sense that they can be regarded as conditional probability distributions derived from a certain "basic probability distribution" over the parameters unknown to the various players. But later the theory is extended also to cases where the different players' subjective probability distributions fail to satisfy this consistency assumption.
Loading...