Bernard Adolph Schriever Quotes

Our development philosophy includes two elements: a philosophy of testing and a dual approach. Stated simply, the test philosophy requires a great deal of component reliability testing at the earliest possible test level in order to insure reliability of components before proceeding to subsystem testing, captive system testing, and on to launch.

But the Sputnik did one thing that was very much a plus: it woke us up and it concerned the American people very much that they [Soviet Union] beat us to the draw in getting the first satellite into orbit. But we at our level, with the information that we had, and what we were doing, knowing that we could easily put something up in space, and we did do that, including putting a reconnaissance satellite, because it was given much higher priority really because of the Sputnik.

You have Stealth technology. That's going to last for a long time, but there will be some breakthroughs on that on the other side from a defense standpoint. What they are, I don't know, but now we're talking about defense against ballistic missiles. We thought at one time that here was a weapon that could never be destroyed by the enemy, but I don't have that same feeling now. I think it can be. But I think you can take actions to counter the defenses that might be set up, too. So it's a game of offense, defense, defense, offense, and so forth, so therefore technology continues as long as we have the world that we're living in.

I think space has tremendous implications on national security policy, on strategy, on force structure, and perhaps even the survivability of the free world. Perhaps I might be accused of overemphasising what I consider to be policy implications on national security matters and specifically on space. But I contend that during the past twenty years, the progress we have made from the military standpoint, has been more limited by our national policy than it has been by availability of technology, or our ability to manage. I think the policy has been very inhibiting not only in space, but has also created what I consider to be today's strategic imbalance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Just look back 20 years. At that time, we had unquestioned superiority. We were respected by both enemies and friends. We certainly were the leaders of the free world.

When I started flying, when I was at Texas A&M [University], we still had horses pulling French 75s around. Now, mind you, this was 1931 when I graduated there. And look where we are today. So it's an awful lot to swallow, and I think we've done extremely well, but we still have a ways to go.

Space capabilities provide reconnaissance, surveillance, communications, weather and navigation. They greatly augment our warning and intelligence capabilities. If we fail to deter war, space systems will improve our ability to deliver weapons, and to assess damage.

A word is necessary on the relationship between military need and scientific feasibility in space technology. In the long haul, our safety as a nation may depend upon our achieving “space superiority.” Several decades from now, the important battles may not be sea battles or air battles, but space battles, and we should be spending a certain fraction of our national resources to insure that we do not lag in obtaining space supremacy.

Well, space overall has had a tremendous impact on national security. We haven't really gotten to the point yet that we understand just how much of a revolution warfighting is going to be, because a major war is very much different than what we're doing now over there in the Balkans [ Kosovo/Yugoslavia ]. I think that it's hard to compare that situation to one where you really have a war. Now, it's a war in the sense of the implements that are used, but the objectives are different. I think that we're in what we call a revolution in military affairs, and it's playing out now.

From the standpoint of the Air Force as a service, I think we have to elevate the whole future, the future’s part of the—you need a four-star general who's looking in the future, who fights like hell, and that includes space, because that's the area that you're going to need the most advance in, in terms of operational applications. I can't name them all, but we need that four-star guy who sits at that decision table and says, "Damn it to hell, I need this and I'll argue with you until the cows come home." You know, you may not win, but you need that advocacy. I don't see it right now. Let me put it this way. I'd like to see it. There's a lot of it; it seems to be more words, and I'd like to see a little more action with the words. Because they're saying the right words, and they're fighting the battle, but I think they can still do better.

However, before man can be committed to space vehicles, a tremendous amount of human factors research will be necessary.

So we have a challenge of optimizing our capability in a completely new environment. Space has intruded, you might say, in many ways, and in other ways it can bring about what I consider a spread in our deterrent overall capability. We can deter by—deterrence requires the deterrer to have the credibility that what he has is something that an enemy can't really do anything but, in the end, lose. Then he's deterred. But if he doesn't, for any reason at all, believe that we can do it, then deterrence flies right out the window.

Perhaps not only initially but for all time, space technology will include as its most characteristic problem the need for going from the surface of one celestial body to another with successful passage through the atmosphere of each.

So we are in a state of rethinking a lot of things, and I think we've made a lot of progress, but we're still in the phase that is—I mean, we're no longer in the trenches. We talked about bringing people over, bringing ground troops into the Balkans. I'm not going to make any comments on that one way or another, but there are—we need more time to come out.

Let's look now at the next ten or fifteen years in space and how it can impact policy, strategy and possibly force structure. I sincerely believe that space, from a military standpoint, is the new high ground. It hasn't arrived, but it will evolve into the new high ground. We've had predominance on land, on the sea, in the air, and now space is next in line. Land was predominant until a few centuries ago. Go back to Alexander the Great and Genghis Khan: it was land capability. The British took maximum advantage of seapower and were predominant for several centuries. I think World War I was an even split between land and sea. In my opinion, World War II could not have been won without air superiority. So airpower today, is the predominant means of applying military force. This was true even in Korea and Vietnam. We all know that from a military standpoint, they were not declared wars. They were a no win situation. They both could have been won with relative ease if we had applied the forces that were available--without need for nuclear weapons.

I've always felt that cooperative programs is one way to eliminate antagonisms and have a better understanding. I think Communism, that threat still exists, it exists in China, and we still have problems. But I think we have a period here where we do have such overawing capability that we can afford to try to get closer cooperation where you really have a trust, you know, and that this visibility—you know, if you don't trust somebody, you can't really ever make much headway, but the way you trust people is to get to know them, and the only way you really get to know them is work together. I think this period right now is one when if we can get Russia more Westernized, so to speak, I think would be a very major step forward in ensuring—it reduces the emotion that always goes with wars or getting close to a war situation. Well, let me put it this way. I think cooperation is a good thing, and we ought to try to do it to the maximum extent, but keep our guard up.