The construction of churches or synagogues in the Mussulman territory is unlawful, this being forbidden in the traditions:—but if places of worship originally belonging to Jews or Christians be destroyed, or fall to decay, they are at liberty to repair them,—because buildings cannot endure for ever, and as the Imán has left these people to the exercise of their own religion, it is a necessary inference that he has engaged not to prevent them from rebuilding or repairing their church and synagogues. If, however, they attempt to remove these, and to build them in a place different from their former situation, the Imán must prevent them, since this is and actual construction: and the places which they use as bermitages are held in the same light as their churches, wherefore the construction of those also is unlawful. It is otherwise with respect to such places of prayer as are within their dwellings, which they are not prohibited from constructing, because these are an appearance to the habitation. What is here said is the rule with respect to the cities; but not with respect to villages or hamlets; because as the tokens of Islám (such as public prayer, festivals, and so forth) appear in cities, Zimmees should not be permitted to celebrate the tokens of infidelity there, in the face of them; but as tokens of Islám do not appear in villages or hamlets, there is no occasion to prevent the construction of synagogues, not only in cities, but also in villages and hamlets; because in the villages of our country various tokens of Islám appear; and what is recorded from Haneefa, (that the prohibition against building churches and synagogues is confined to cities, and does not extend to villages and hamlets) relates solely to the villages of Koofa, because the greater part of the inhabitants of the villages are Zimmes, there being few Mussulmans among them, wherefore the tokens of Islám do not there appear: moreover, in the territory of Arabia, Zimmees are prohibited from constructing churches or synagogues either in cities or villages, because the prophet has said "Two religions cannot be professed together in the peninsula of Arabia."
muhaddith, faqih and author (1135-1197)
Burhān al-Dīn Abu’l-Ḥasan ‘Alī bin Abī Bakr bin ‘Abd al-Jalīl al-Farghānī al-Marghīnānī (Arabic: برهان الدين المرغيناني) was an Islamic scholar of the school of jurisprudence. He was born in Marghinan near Farghana in 530/1135 (in present day ) He died in 593/1197.
From: Wikiquote (CC BY-SA 4.0)
Alternative Names:
Ali ibn Abu Bakr al- Marghinani
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Burhān al-Dīn Abu’l-Ḥasan ‘Alī bin Abī Bakr bin ‘Abd al-Jalīl al-Farghānī al-Marghīnānī[
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ʻAlī ibn Abī Bakr al-Marghīnānī
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Abul Hasan Ali bin Abu Bakr bin Abdul Jalil Farghani Marghinani Rashtani
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If a person becomes a Mussulman, who is indebted for any arrear of capitation-tax, such arrear is remitted: and in the same manner, the arrear of capitation-tax due from Zimmee is remitted upon his dying in a state of infidelity. Shafei holds that the tax is not remitted in either case; because it was due either in return for protection to the person, or in return for permission to reside in the mussulman territory; and the Zimmee or convert has continued under protection, and resided in the Mussulman territory: the return from him, therefore, is not to be remitted in consequence of the supervenient circumstance of death, or convention of the faith; in the same manner, as in case of hire, or of composition for blood;—in other words, if capitation tax be a return for residence, it comes under the construction hire, and is not remitted in consequence of death, or conversion to the faith, in the same manner as if a Zimme were to hire a house and reside therein for the period agreed upon, and then die, or embrace the faith, in which case the rent of the house does not cease; and so likewise with respect to capitation-tax:—or, if capitation-tax be a return for protection to the person, it comes under the construction of a composition for blood, and is not remitted in consequence of death or conversion to the faith, in the same manner as if a Zimme were wilfully to kill a person, and afterwards enter into composition for the murder with the friends of the deceased, for a certain consideration, and them become a Mussulman, or die, in which case the consideration is not remitted from him;—and so likewise capitation-tax, (which is the consideration for protection to his person,) is not remitted. The arguments of our doctors upon this point are threefold.—First, the prophet has declared that "capitation-tax is not incumbent upon Mussulmans:"—Secondly, capitation-tax is a species of punishment, inflicted upon infidels on account of their infidelity, whence it is termed Yizyat, which is derived from Yizya, meaning retribution; now the temporal punishment of infidelity is remitted in consequence of conversion to the faith; and after death it cannot be inflicted, because temporal punishments are instituted solely for the purpose of removing evil, which is removed by either death or Islám:—THIRDLY, capitation-tax is a substitute for aid to the Mussulmans, and as the infidel in question, upon embracing the faith, becomes enabled to aid them in his own person, capitation-tax consequently drops upon his Islám.—With respect to the a to the argument adduced by Shafei, we reply that capitation-tax is neither consideration for protection to person, nor residence, because protection to the person is established in virtue of humanity, and a Zimme resides, in the mussulman territory, within his own dwelling; wherefore the case does not admit that a consideration, for protection to his person, or for residence, should be exacted from him.
CAPITATION-TAX is not imposed upon Ráhibs, (that is, Christian or Pagan monks and hermits, who do not mix with the rest of mankind:)—the same is mentioned by Kadooree: Mohammed, in the Jama-Sagbeer, reports from Haneefa that capitation-tax may be imposed upon those, where they are capable of labour, (and such is the opinion of Aboo Yoofaf;) because where, being capable of labour, they refrain from it, they waste their ability; capitation-taxt, therefore, is due from the,m. in the same manner as tribute from the landholder, where he (being able) suffers his land to remain unfilled.—The reason for what is related by Kadoore is that a monk is not to be destroyed where he does does not mix with mankind; and capitation-tax, with respect to them, would be for the purpose of warding off destruction.
CAPITATION-TAX is not imposed upon slaves, Mokátibs, Modabbirs, or Am-Walids, because capitation-tax is a substitute for destruction, with respect to them, and; with respect to us, it is substitute for aid [in the wars of the faith;] now in conformity with the first of these, it would, it would follo that capitation-taxt is due; a doubt therefore arises with respec to its being due; and as this is the case, it is determined not to be incumbent upon them: neither is it incumbent upon their owner to pay capitation-taxt for them, because he himself by their means pays an increased capitation-tax, as he through them becomes rich, or obtains a mediocrity of circumstances; and in either case he pays capitation-tax in a degree superior to the labouring poor.
CAPITATION-TAX is to be imposed upon Kitabees, because this is mentioned in the Koran: and it is in the same manner to be imposed upon Majoosees, as the prophet imposed capitation-tax upon Majoosees.—Capitation-tax is also imposed upon the idolaters of Ajim, [Persia.] This is contrary to the opinion of Shafei, for he argues that destruction is incurred by all infidels; but the legality of abstaining from it, in consideration of a capitation-tax, with respect to Kitabees. is known from the word of KORAN, and with respect to Majoosees, from the traditions; any others, therefore, than those, (namely, idolaters,) remain subject to the original penalty, which is destruction. The argument of our doctors is that it is lawful to make slaves of the Idolaters of Ajim, it follows that it is also lawful to impose capitation-tax upon them because, in the same manner as, by reducing them to slavery, they are deprived of power over their own persons, so also, they are deprived of power over their own persons by the imposition of capitation-tax, since they must in this case work, and pay the Mussalmans the produce of their labour, and their subsistence is furnished from their labour. If a Mussulman army subdue an infidel territory before any capitation-tax be established, the inhabitants, together with their wives and children, are all plunder, and the property of the state, as it is lawful to reduce to slavery all infidels, whether they be Kitcbees, Majoofees, or idolaters.
JIZYAT, or capitation-tax, is or two kinds. The first species is that which is established voluntarily, and by composition,—the rate of which si such as may be agreed upon by both parties,—because the prophet entered into a composition with the tribe of Bimmey Birán, for twelve hundred pieces of cloth, and not more,—and also, because the fixing of tribute in this mode is mutual act of both parties, and therefore is not lawful to swerve from what has been so mutually agreed upon. The second species is that which the Imán himself imposes, where he conquers infidels, and then confirms them in their possessions, the common rate of which is fixed by his imposing upon every avowedly rich person a tax of forty-eight dirms per annum, or four dirms per month;—and upon every person in middling circumstances, twenty-four dirms per annum, or two dirms per month;—and upon the labouring poor twelve dirms per annum, or one dirm per month. This is according to our doctors. Shafei maintains that he should exact from each sane and adult person, one deenar, or something to that amount;—and the poor and wealthy are on an equal footing in this point; because the prophet said to Máaz, "Take from every male and female adult one DEENAR, or cloth to that value, —from wich it appears that there is no manner of difference between the rich and the poor, as the prophet spoke generally, without making any distinction: moreover, capitation-tax is due only in lieu of destruction, (whence is that it is not due from persons the destruction of whom on account of infidelity is illegal, namely women and children,) and in this sense it applies equally to the rich and the poor.—The arguments of our doctors upon this head are twofold.—FIRST, their doctrine is adopted from Omar, Othman, and Ali, with whom all the companions agreed upon this point: SECONDLY, capitation-tax serves as an aid to the troops, and therefore differs in its rate, according to the difference of men's circumstances, in the same manner as tribute upon land. The ground of this is the capitation-tax is due in lieu of assistance, with person and property; but as property is different with respect to being more or less, so in the same manner that is different, which is a substitute for it.—With respect to the tradition adduced by Shafei, we are only to understand from it that the taking of deenars, and so forth, from the tribe to whom he alluded was in the way of a composition, in which there is no difference between the poor and the rich, as is further proved by the term female adults, im the saying referred to, since capitation-tax is not incumbent upon women. It is to be observed that in the exaction of capitation-tax from the labouring poor, it is a condition that the person upon whom it is levied be in state or health for greater part of the year. ... Whence it is that it cannot be accepted of the infidel if he send it by the hands of a messenger, but must be exacted in a mortifying and humiliating manner, by the collector sitting and receiving it from him in a standing posture; (according to one tradition), the collector is to seize him by the throat, and shake him saying ‘Pay your tax, Zimmee’.
If the Imám should not bestow in gratuity the Sillib (or personal property) of one who is slain, upon the slayer, it becomes a part of the general plunder, in which the slayer and other have all an equal share. Shafei maintains that the personal effects of the person slain belong to the slayer, provided the latter be one of those who are entitled to share in the plunder, and that he killed the slain in open fight, because the prophet has said, "Whoever slays an INFIDEL is "entitled to his personal property."
OBJECTION.—It is possible that the prophet may have mentioned this merely in a gratious sense, and not as the award of the LAW.
REPLY.—It is evident, from the situation of the prophet, that he spoke this as an award of the LAW; since he was sent to enforce the awards of the LAW. A person, moreover, who kills another prepared to oppose him in open fight exposes himself in a superior degree, and hence the personal property of the slain goes to him, for the purpose of making a distinction between him and others.
The Imam, with respect to captives, has it in his choice to slay them because the Prophet put captives to death and also because slaying them terminates wickedness; or, if he choose, he may make them slaves, because by enslaving them the wickedness of them is remedied, and at the same time the Muslims reap an advantage; or, if he please, he may release them so as to make them freemen and Zimmis, according to what is recorded of Omar. … but it is not lawful so to release the idolaters of Arabia, or apostates… If captives become Muslims, let not the Imam put them to death; … but yet he may lawfully make them slaves, after their conversion…
Definition of the term.—Nifka, in the language of the law, signifies all those things which are necessary to the support of life, such as food, clothes, and lodging: many confine it solely to food and the latter poor; and as the Prophet in his decision left this to the judgment of the parties themselves, the proportion is not specifically determined by the law.— Shafei has so determined it, saying that the Nifka or maintenance incumbent upon a husband in behalf of his wife, if he be opulent, is two Mids, or about one thousand Dirms annually,— if he be poor, one Mid: and if in middling circumstances, one and a half: this, however, is not admitted, because a thing declared to be incumbent "so far as may suffice" cannot be legally fixed at any specific rate, as the proportion must neces- sarily vary according to circumstances. And this, although she withhold herself on account of her dower. — If a woman refuse to surrender herself to her husband, on account of her dower (that is, on account of its not having been paid to her), her maintenance does not drop, but is incumbent upon the husband, although she be not yet within his custody, since her refusal is only in pursuance of her right, and consequently the object; on to the matrimonial custody originates with the husband. But not if she be refractory. — If a wife be disobedient or refractory, and go abroad without her husband's consent, she is not entitled to any support from him, until she return and make submission, because the rejection of the matrimonial restraint in this instance originates with her; but when she returns home, she is then subject to it, for which reason she again becomes entitled to her support as before. It is otherwise where a woman, residing in the house of her husband, refuses to admit him to the conjugal embrace, as she is entitled to maintenance, notwithstanding her opposition, because being then in his power, he may, if he please, enjoy her by force. But not if she be refractory.—If a wife be disobedient or refractory and go abroad without her husband’s consent, she is not entitled to any support from him, until she return and make submission, because the rejection of the matrimonial restraint in this instance originates with her; but when she returns home, she is then subject to it, for which reason she again becomes entitled to her support as before. It is otherwise where a woman, residing in the house of her husband, refuses to admit him to the conjugal embrace, as she is entitled to maintenance, notwithstanding her opposition, because being then in his power, he may, if he please, enjoy her by force.