It is this common danger which ought always to be kept in view as the true basis of the alliance, and which ought to preclude defection from the comm… - Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh

He had now the satisfaction to say, that although he was unable to announce the immediate and actual abolition of the [slave] trade, all the Powers of Europe had agreed that it should not be extended beyond the period at which by possibility it could be terminated. They had concurred in a solemn address to the world, on the necessity of sweeping a trade, so intolerable in a moral point of view, from the face of the earth, and had pledged themselves to take no further time for that purpose than was necessary for the internal regulation of their own dominions.

Fouché and men of his stamp are nowhere so little to be dreaded as in office, mixed up with other materials. Tyrants may poison or murder an obnoxious character, but the surest and only means a constitutional sovereign has to restrain such a character is to employ him. Office soon strips him of his most dangerous adherents—he comes unpopular, he can be laid aside at pleasure, and sinks to his true lead. So far from making himself visibly responsible for everything, the King ought to throw upon his Ministers the odium and risk of conducting his service. His Majesty ought to turn the political control towards the Minister for the time being and not entertain it himself beyond affording him the due support which his services may deserve. This is the true strength of a constitutional king. All paper constitutions are of comparatively small importance; the essence of a free state is so to manage the party warfare, as to reconcile it with the safety of the sovereign—to do this, the King must give the contending parties facilities against each other, and not embark himself too deeply with any.

In thus attempting to limit the objects of the Alliance within their legitimate Boundary, it is not meant to discourage the utmost frankness of communication between the Allied Cabinets; their Confidential Intercourse upon all Matters, however foreign to the Purposes of the Alliance, is in itself a valuable expedient for keeping the current of sentiment in Europe as equable and as uniform as may be... but what is intended to be combated as forming any part of their Duty as Allies, is the Notion, but too perceptibly prevalent, that whenever any great Political Event shall occur, as in Spain, pregnant perhaps with future Danger, it is to be regarded almost as a matter of course, that it belongs to the Allies to charge themselves collectively with the Responsibility of exercising some Jurisdiction concerning such possible eventual Danger. One objection to this view of our Duties, if there was no other, is, that unless We are prepared to support out interference with force, our judgment or advice is likely to be but rarely listened to, and would by frequent Repetition soon fall into complete contempt. So long as We keep to the great and simple conservative principles of the Alliance, when the Dangers therein contemplated shall be visibly realised, there is little risk of difference or of disunion amongst the Allies.