[I]t is our main purpose not to limit our discussion to thermal equilibrium, but to explore the relationship of this probabilistic formulation to the… - Ludwig Boltzmann

But this theory agrees in so many respects with the facts, that we can hardly doubt that in es certain entities, the number and size of which can roughly be determined, fly about pell-mell. Can it be seriously expected that they will behave exactly as aggregates of Newtonian centres of force, or as the rigid bodies of our Mechanics? And how awkward is the human mind in divining the nature of things, when forsaken by the analogy of what we see and touch directly?

We want first to solve the problem... namely to calculate the probability of state distributions from the number of different distributions. We want first to treat as simple a case as possible, namely a gas of rigid absolutely elastic spherical molecules trapped in a container with absolutely elastic walls. Even in this case, the application of is not easy. The number of molecules is not infinite... yet the number of velocities each molecule is capable of is effectively infinite... to facilitate understanding, I will... consider a limiting case.

But if we ask why this state is not yet reached, we again come to a "Salisburian mystery."
I will conclude this paper with an idea of my old assistant, Dr. Schuetz.
We assume that the whole universe is, and rests for ever, in thermal equilibrium. The probability that one (only one) part of the universe is in a certain state, is the smaller the further this state is from thermal equilibrium; but this probability is greater, the greater is the universe itself. If we assume the universe great enough, we can make the probability of one relatively small part being in any given state (however far from the state of thermal equilibrium), as great as we please. We can also make the probability great that, though the whole universe is in thermal equilibrium, our world is in its present slate. It may be said that the world is so far from thermal equilibrium that we cannot imagine the improbability of such a state. But can we imagine, on the other side, how small a part of the whole universe this world is? Assuming the universe great enough, the probability that such a small part of it as our world should be in its present state, is no longer small.