From the very first deals we did at EGI, I have spread the opportunity — both the risks and the rewards. We co-invest, side by side, and I often prov… - Sam Zell

In very short order, we were able to persuade Blackstone to raise its bid to $48.50 a share for a total of $20 billion, plus $16 billion in debt, or $36 billion total. I insisted that our agreement include an unusually small breakup fee so other potential bidders wouldn’t be discouraged. The typical breakup fee is up to 3 percent of the selling price, but I set ours at $200 million — around 1 percent of the offer’s equity value. Obviously, this didn’t sit well with Blackstone, but it was not negotiable.

I believed that the fundamentals of real estate were universal. That is, issues of supply and demand, demographics, capital flows, and so on were as relevant overseas as they were here at home.

I put up virtually no capital, just a limited guarantee that I’d feed the deficit of the loan if necessary to keep it current over a three-year period, which was how long I thought it would take for the market’s supply/demand equilibrium to return. It worked because the lenders’ only alternative was to take back the assets, which meant taking over management — something they did not want to do. They had no structure in place to manage all those buildings. We did. We were ready. There was so much supply and opportunity we branched out from apartments into retail and office buildings. Between 1974 and 1977, we bought roughly $4 billion in assets with $1 down and a hope certificate.