When everyone is part of the people’s congress, what need is there for an opposition? Opposition to what? You oppose a government! If there is no government, and the people govern themselves on their own, what are they going to oppose? Something that isn’t there?

To oppose something is to maintain it. They say here “all roads lead to Mishnory.” To be sure, if you turn your back on Mishnory and walk away from it, you are still on the Mishnory road. To oppose vulgarity is inevitably to be vulgar. You must go somewhere else; you must have another goal; then you walk a different road.

Look to France before the period of her revolution. Was it the facility of public meetings, or the freedom of discussion granted to the subject, that tended to produce that great change? On the contrary, was it not the absolute prerogative of the king? Was it not the arbitrary power lodged in ministers? Was it not the oppressive privilege of issuing Lettres de Cachet against all who dared to utter their sentiments, and complain of existing grievances, that excited the indignation of the people and accelerated the downfall of the monarchy? If, therefore, one view on which the present measure is held out to your acceptance, be in order to prevent the troubles arising from the frequency of popular assemblies, on that very ground ought the friends of peace and of order to resist the adoption of the measure.

Every act of resistance by Māori since 1840 has been met with opposition … Those who take power unjustly defend it with injustice

When men, engaged in unjustifiable pursuits, are aware that obstructions may come from a quarter which they cannot control, they will often be restrained by the bare apprehension of opposition, from doing what they would with eagerness rush into, if no such external impediments were to be feared.

Attempts to enforce by legal sanctions, acts obnoxious to so great a proportion of Citizens, tend to enervate the laws in general, and to slacken the bands of Society. If it be difficult to execute any law which is not generally deemed necessary or salutary, what must be the case, where it is deemed invalid and dangerous? And what may be the effect of so striking an example of impotency in the Government, on its general authority?

The State may either attempt to change the opinions of its citizens for its own advantage; —and in this case, it partly undertakes a thing which it cannot accomplish, and partly shows that its laws are not adapted to the existing condition of the nation to which this system of opinion belongs; or, that the governing power is inadequate, and, being unable to trust to its own resources, needs the aid of a foreign power which can never be thoroughly incorporated with it. Or, the State may attempt, perhaps with the purest intentions, and from the warmest zeal on the part of its administrators for promoting the dominion of Reason, it may attempt to combat the prevailing opinions by means of external power;-and in this case it undertakes a thing in which it can never succeed, for all men feel that it then takes the form of injustice, and the persecuted opinion being thus to a certain extent established in its right, gains new friends by the injustice which it suffers, and by this conviction of the justice of its cause acquires a stronger power of opposition; and the matter ends by the State being obliged to yield, whereby it once more only shows its weakness.

To oppose something is to maintain it.

Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices they hold under the State establishments;

People seek government action because they don't approve of what other people choose to do with their lives. They want to overrule the decisions others have made concerning the use of their own time and money.

I am not friendly to any thing that will produce violence. Those who know me will not impute to me any such desire; but I do hope, that this bill will produce an alarm: that while we have the power of assembling, the people will assemble; that while they have the power, they will not surrender it, but come forward and state their abhorrence of the principle of this proceeding; and those who do not, I pronounce to be traitors to their country. Good God, Sir, what madness, what frenzy has overtaken the authors of this measure! I will suppose for a moment that the only object which they have in view is the preventing a revolution in this country. But that they should have proceeded upon a plan which has no regard tor the liberty of the people, no regard for the glorious efforts of our ancestors, no regard for their maxims, no esteem for the principles and the conduct which have made us what we are, or rather, if this bill be countenanced, what we were, is to me astonishing! For to proceed thus, in order to suppress or prevent popular tumults, appears to me to be the most desperate infatuation. Good God, Sir! We have seen and have heard of revolutions in different states. Were they owing to the freedom of popular opinions? Were they owing to the facility of popular meetings? No, Sir, they were owing to the reverse of these; and therefore I say, if we wish to avoid the danger of such revolutions, we should put ourselves in a state as different from them as possible. What are we now doing? Putting ourselves in a condition nearly resembling the periods when these revolutions happened.

The representatives of the people, in a popular assembly, seem sometimes to fancy that they are the people themselves, and betray strong symptoms of impatience and disgust at the least sign of opposition from any other quarter; as if the exercise of its rights, by either the executive or judiciary, were a breach of their privilege and an outrage to their dignity. They often appear disposed to exert an imperious control over the other departments; and as they commonly have the people on their side, they always act with such momentum as to make it very difficult for the other members of the government to maintain the balance of the Constitution.

An oppressive legislature could drive the people to refuse to pay their taxes and to revolt with guns. We didn’t want that, so we were trying to create a revolution with fountain pens, rather than with rifles, clubs, or a confrontation between the people and the government.

There are few things that enrage the American public more than crooked, dark money political spending. If you tried to get a dark money political spending bill through the Senate, you couldn't do it. If you tried to get it through the House, you couldn't do it. If you put the Senate and House under Republican control, you still couldn't do it, but if you have captured the Supreme Court [...] then a decision that is as unpopular and enraging as this decision comes your way, and they pulled it off in plain daylight.