This Administration has been looking hard at exactly what civil defense can and cannot do. It cannot be obtained cheaply. It cannot give an assurance of blast protection that will be proof against surprise attack or guaranteed against obsolescence or destruction. And it cannot deter a nuclear attack. We will deter an enemy from making a nuclear attack only if our retaliatory power is so strong and so invulnerable that he knows he would be destroyed by our response. If we have that strength, civil defense is not needed to deter an attack. If we should ever lack it, civil defense would not be an adequate substitute. But this deterrent concept assumes rational calculations by rational men. And the history of this planet, and particularly the history of the 20th century, is sufficient to remind us of the possibilities of an irrational attack, a miscalculation, an accidental war, for a war of escalation in which the stakes by each side gradually increase to the point of maximum danger which cannot be either foreseen or deterred. It is on this basis that civil defense can be readily justifiable--as insurance for the civilian population in case of an enemy miscalculation. It is insurance we trust will never be needed--but insurance which we could never forgive ourselves for foregoing in the event of catastrophe. Once the validity of this concept is recognized, there is no point in delaying the initiation of a nation-wide long-range program of identifying present fallout shelter capacity and providing shelter in new and existing structures. Such a program would protect millions of people against the hazards of radioactive fallout in the event of large-scale nuclear attack. Effective performance of the entire program not only requires new legislative authority and more funds, but also sound organizational arrangements.

Until others in the world come to their senses, and join with us in banishing the awful spectre of nuclear war, we must be strong; we must have weapons fully as modern and as effective -- if possible more effective -- than the weapons which we know to be in possession of others who would destroy our way of life. At the same time, we must do all in our power to ensure the survival of the largest possible numbers of our population if war should be forced upon us. A major part of this latter effort is, of course, the responsibility of you who are engaged in civil defense.

The free world, at least dimly aware of these facts, has naturally embarked on a large program of warning and defense systems. That program will be accelerated and extended. But let no one think that the expenditure of vast sums for weapons and systems of defense can guarantee absolute safety for the cities and citizens of any nation. The awful arithmetic of the atomic bomb does not permit of any such easy solution. Even against the most powerful defense, an aggressor in possession of the effective minimum number of atomic bombs for a surprise attack could probably place a sufficient number of his bombs on the chosen targets to cause hideous damage.

While confident that our present strength will continue to deter a thermonuclear war, we must always be alert to the possibilities for limiting destruction which might be inflicted upon our people, cities and industry--should such a war be forced upon us. Many proposals have been advanced for means of limiting damage and destruction to the United States in the event of a thermonuclear war. Shifting strategy and advancing technology make the program of building adequate defenses against nuclear attack extremely complex. Decisions with respect to further limitation of damage require complex calculations concerning the effectiveness of many interrelated elements. Any comprehensive program would involve the expenditure of tens of billions of dollars. We must not shrink from any expense that is justified by its effectiveness, but we must not hastily expend vast sums on massive programs that do not meet this test. It is already clear that without fall-out shelter protection for our citizens, all defense weapons lose much of their effectiveness in saving lives. This also appears to be the least expensive way of saving millions of lives, and the one which has clear value even without other systems. We will continue our existing programs and start a program to increase the total inventory of shelters through a survey of private homes and other small structures. We shall continue the research and development which retains the options to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system, and manned interceptors and surface-to-air missiles against bombers.

To remain free, we must have the means of defending ourselves against surprise attack, and we must know how best to protect the lives of our civilians. To do this, we must develop modern weapons which are at least as powerful as those in possession of those who threaten us. Only through our obvious strength can we deter the recklessness of others.

Our forces are balanced and ready, mobile and diverse. Our allies trust our strength and our adversaries respect it. But the challenge is unceasing. The forms of conflict become more subtle and more complex every day. We must--and we shall--adapt our forces and our tactics to fulfill our purposes. If our military strength is to be fully usable in times requiring adaptation and response to changing challenges, that strength must be so organized and so managed that it may be employed with planned precision as well as promptness. The state of our defenses is enhanced today because we have established an orderly system for informed decision-making and planning. Our planning and budgeting programs are now conducted on a continuing five-year basis and cover our total military requirements. Our national strategy, military force structure, contingency plans and defense budget are all now related in an integrated plan. Our orderly decision-making now combines our best military judgment with the most advanced scientific and analytical techniques. Our military policy under the Secretary of Defense is now more closely tied than ever to the conduct of foreign policy under the Secretary of State. Thus, we now have the ability to provide and maintain a balanced, flexible military force, capable of meeting the changing requirements of a constantly changing challenge.

There have been, from time to time, changes in the degree of destructiveness of weapons and of war. These changes, until recent decades, generally have been considered not to have invalidated the precepts of Western civilization and its antecedent cultures of the moral obligation to defend its freedoms, diversity, and cultural growth from tyranny, reaction, and cultural stagnation or death. But with the advent of the nuclear age, we are faced with a change in degree that threatens to become one of kind. The destructive nature of nuclear war dictates that we no longer regard war as merely the continuation of policy by other means. The deterrence of nuclear war, until such time as technology provides a more reliable and stable method, must, for the United States, be based upon the capability to prevail if deterrence should fail. But this must be combined with an effort to join with other nations in the creation of a just international order.

With the emergence of nuclear-missile weaponry, cybernetics, electronics, and computer equipment, any subjective approach to military problems, hare-brained plans, and superficiality can cause irreparable damage.

The problem in defense is how far you can go without destroying from within what you are trying to defend from without.

What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies? I know this is a formidable, technical task, one that may not be accomplished before the end of this century. Yet, current technology has attained a level of sophistication where it's reasonable for us to begin this effort. It will take years, probably decades of effort on many fronts. There will be failures and setbacks, just as there will be successes and breakthroughs. And as we proceed, we must remain constant in preserving the nuclear deterrent and maintaining a solid capability for flexible response. But isn't it worth every investment necessary to free the world from the threat of nuclear war? We know it is.

We cannot continue to rely only on our military in order to achieve the national security objectives that we've set. We've got to have a civilian national security force that's just as powerful, just as strong, just as well-funded.

In order for great progress to be made on methods and weapons of war, there has to be a system of close joint effort of military and civilian men, especially engineers. The civilians must have independence and the opportunity to explore the bizarre; it is not enough that they be the engineers of contractors to the armed forces. Above all, there must be mutual respect and reliance. This must be present whenever we have to fight again.

Until a system of comprehensive disarmament is achieved -- based on something more reliable than dramatic gestures and mere promises made by nations which have repeatedly violated their solemn commitments -- our national survival and the security of our homes requires that we have -- in being .. the means of defending ourselves against sudden nuclear attack. There is no other prudent course. Without the ability to defend ourselves, we could not hope to deter an enemy from making war upon us, or to retaliate effectively and decisively once we were under attack. And without that strength, we would have to speak in a small and deferential voice in our efforts to build the foundations of a durable peace. Only so long as we are strong can we negotiate; the weak can only submit.

Basically the American modernization (of nuclear weapons), and Russia’s unfortunate inability to improve their early-warning system, has resulted in a situation where everything is potentially a lot more dangerous, because an accident could much more easily occur. And this is both a social, political and technical problem.