It will thus be seen that every time a proposal for the reform of the constitution comes forth, the Muslims are there, ready with some new political demand or demands. The only check upon such indefinite expansion of Muslim demands is the power of the British Government, which must be the final arbiter in any dispute between the Hindus and the Muslims. Who can confidently say that the decision of the British will not be in favour of the Muslims, if the dispute relating to these new demands was referred to them for arbitration? The more the Muslims demand, the more accommodating the British seem to become. At any rate, past experience shows that the British have been inclined to give the Muslims more than what the Muslims had themselves asked.

Mr. Jinnah in a statement issued from Bombay on September 11, 1946 offered to the Hindus the choice between creating Pakistan and forcing a Civil War in the country. Replying to a question seeking suggestions for the restoration of peace in India, he said:” “In view of the horrible slaughter in various parts of India, I am of the opinion that the authorities, both Central and Provincial, should take up immediately the question of exchange of population to avoid brutal recurrence of that which had taken place where small minorities have been butchered by the overwhelming majorities.”

To take one instance, Saiyid Ali Hamadani urged that the following ‘covenant’ be imposed on the Hindus:
• They (the Hindus) will not build new idol temples.
• They will not rebuild any existing temple which may have fallen into disrepair.
• Muslim travellers will not be prevented from staying in temples.
• Zimmis will courteously receive a Muslim wishing to attend their meetings.
• They will not ride horses with saddle and bridle.
• They will not possess swords, bows or arrows.
• They will not openly practise their traditional customs amongst Muslims.
• They will not mourn their dead loudly.....

[Soon after the Muslim League had passed its resolution demanding Pakistan in 1940, the Dravidian ideologue E.V. Ramasamy Nayakar (popularly known as EVR) passed a similar resolution demanding a sovereign state, to be called Dravidistan. In 1941, at the twenty-eight Annual session of the Muslim League, Jinnah and EVR shared the dais and Jinnah extended full support to splitting off something called Dravidistan:]
I have every sympathy and shall do all to help, and you establish Dravidistan, where the seven percent Muslim population will stretch its hand of friendship and live with you on lines of security, justice and fair play.

The Sultanate in India was based on the distinction between its Hindu and Muslim subjects. The Muslims formed the ruling caste. Naturally, the position of the Hindus differed in many respects from that of their Muslim neighbours. Ahkam-ul-Salatinya of the Almawardi lays down 6 compulsory stipulations for non- Muslims living under a Muslim ruler : (i) no criticism of the Quran, (ii) nor of the Prophet, (iii) nor of Islam, (iv) no marriage or adultery with Muslim woman, (v) no seduction from the true faith, and (vi) no help to the enemies of Islam. The non-compulsory demands include a special dress for non-Muslims, prohibition against religious propaganda among Muslims, the sounding of ‘Nagus’ so loudly as to reach Muslims ears, building houses higher in height than neighbouring Muslims houses, drinking in public and riding fine horses and the stipulation that they should bury their dead without openly chanting religious prayers. The building of new temples could be prohibited. The non-Muslims were permitted to have their cases decided by their own judges.

If the Hindus sang Vande Mãtaram in a public meeting, it was a ‘conspiracy’ to convert Muslims into kãfirs. If the Hindus blew a conch, or broke a coconut, or garlanded the portrait of a revered patriot, it was an attempt to ‘force’ Muslims into ‘idolatry’. If the Hindus spoke in any of their native languages, it was an ‘affront’ to the culture of Islam. If the Hindus took pride in their pre-Islamic heroes, it was a ‘devaluation’ of Islamic history. And so on, there were many more objections, major and minor, to every national self-expression. In short, it was a demand that Hindus should cease to be Hindus and become instead a faceless conglomeration of rootless individuals. On the other hand, the ‘minority community’ was not prepared to make the slightest concession in what they regarded as their religious and cultural rights. If the Hindus requested that cow-killing should stop, it was a demand for renouncing an ‘established Islamic practice’. If the Hindus objected to an open sale of beef in the bazars, it was an ‘encroachment’ on the ‘civil rights’ of the Muslims. If the Hindus demanded that cows meant for ritual slaughter should not be decorated and marched through Hindu localities, it was ‘trampling upon time-honoured Islamic traditions’. If the Hindus appealed that Hindu religious processions passing through a public thoroughfare should not be obstructed, it was an attempt to ‘disturb the peace of Muslim prayers’. If the Hindus wanted their native languages to attain an equal status with Urdu in the courts and the administration, it was an ‘assault on Muslim culture’. If the Hindus taught to their children the true history of Muslim tyrants, it was a ‘hate campaign against Islamic heroes’. And the ‘minority community’ was always ready to ‘defend’ its ‘religion and culture’ by taking recourse to street riots.

A modern lawyer like Muslim League leader Mohammed Ali Jinnah completely thought inside the modern democratic framework where numbers are important. But to an obscurantist like Azad, this didn’t matter: democracy was only a temporary circumstance that need not stand in the way of turning a united India into a Muslim empire. Moreover, Muslims could convert Hindus, and through their superiority in demographic growth (from 19% to 24% in the sixty years before Independence), they would eventually become the majority. Moreover, Azad seized upon Mahatma Gandhi’s proposal to form an all-Muslim Cabinet as the ultimate “compromise” (i.e. surrender) to avert Partition. So, he dreamed of Islamizing all of India rather than only the Pakistani part of it.

Jinnah introduced the Muslim Waqf Act in 1911, and until 1954, it was referred to as ‘Jinnah Law.’ The existence of separate legal systems for Hindus and Muslims contributed to the partition of the country.

66 ‘Indeed in the subsequent years the Congress policy can be quite correctly described as “Peace at any Price” and “Congress in Office at all costs”. The Congress compromised with the British who placed it in office and in return, the Congress surrendered to the violence of Mr. Jinnah, carved out one-third of India to him, an explicitly racial and theological State, and destroyed two million human beings in the process. Pandit Nehru now professes again and again that the Congress stands for a secular State and violently denounces those who remind him that only last year he agreed to a communal and theological State; his vociferous adherence to a “Secular State” is nothing but a case of “my lady protests too much”.’

It is quite true that partition far from proving to be a solution to the Muslim problem has only aggravated it. But it is simply not true that there was a happy solution waiting round the corner only if partition had been avoided. For the Muslims demanded parity as the price for remaining in a politically united India and surely this was an impossible demand.

Let us not be taken in by the howls of contrived grievances which the spokesmen of Islam in India have started hawking in increasingly hysterical voices. In the history of Islam this has always been a prelude to predatory action. Hajjaj had hawked some grievances against Raja Dahir on the eve of equipping an armed force more formidable than any that had ever been sent against Sindh. The Pirpur Report of the Muslim League was only a preparation for the demand for Pakistan.

To this convention you must re-state as clearly and as strongly as possible, the political objective of Indian Muslims as a distinct political unit in the country. It is absolutely necessary to tell the world both inside and outside India that the economic problem is not the only problem in the country. From the Muslim point of view the cultural problem is of much greater consequence to most Indian Muslims. At any rate it is not less important than the economic problem.

There was an impression of hope and optimism when the Conference started, but very soon it was clear that Jinnah’s intransigence and rearguard action by the imperialists would make it impossible for it to succeed. The negotiations broke down because Jinnah insisted that all the Muslim members of the Executive Council should be nominated only by the League. Nor were the British willing to sign any agreement with the Congress to which the Muslim League was not a party. The policy of ‘Divide and Rule’ was at its zenith.

The same would have counted in principle for the Ram Janmabhoomi. However, there the situation has been slightly more advanced : in 1949 it already became a Hindu temple again. And it is not the Hindus who have been demanding a hand-over, it is actually the Muslim groups like BMAC, BMMCC, IUML, Jama'at Islami. It is unbelievably arrogant that some Muslims could be against the hand-over of even one of the thousands of stolen Hindu places, and still have dared to demand the hand- over of that one mosque that they let slip through their fingers in 1949. They demand the return of 100% of the places they lost, and want to return 0% of the places they took. Who said that Islam believes in equality?