Charles James Fox Quotes

His opinion, indeed, was well known to those, who had done him the honour to attend to him; it was, that at all times, in all countries, and upon all occasions, there should be no distinctions in political rights, on account of religious opinions. He thought that the prejudices of the people were, generally speaking, worthy of attention. But when prejudices bent against the general principles of toleration, he did not think them entitled to much respect.

He would never forgo inquiry into the causes of the war, and measures to prevent similar calamities in future. This was due to the people, least, in the enjoyment of peace, they should forget their former sufferings from war, and again yield themselves up to delusion. Both the present and the American war were owing to a court party in this country, that hated the very name of liberty; and to an indifference, amounting to barbarity, in the minister, to the distresses of the people. It was some consolation to him that he had done his utmost to prevent the war, and to know that those who provoked it could not but feel, even while they were endeavouring to persuade others of the contrary, that they must, in no very long space of time, adopt the very course which he was recommending as fit to be adopted now.

In his opinion, the best security for the due maintenance of the constitution, was in the strict and incessant vigilance of the people over parliament itself. Meetings of the people, therefore, for the discussion of public objects, were not merely legal, but laudable.

To deny to the people the right of discussion, because upon some occasions, that right had been exercised by indiscreet or bad men, was what he could not subscribe to. The right of popular discussion was a salutary and an essential privilege of the subject. He would not answer long for the conduct of parliament, if it were not subject to the jealousy of the people.

Was every man who had liberty in his mouth to be considered as a traitor, merely because liberty had been abused in France, and had been carried to the most shocking licentiousness? He would venture to say, that if this was to be the consequence, fatal, indeed, would it be for England! If the love of liberty was not to be maintained in England; if the warm admiration of it was not to be cherished in the hearts of the people: if the maintenance of liberty was not to be inculcated as a duty; if it was not to be reverenced as our chief good, as our boast and pride and richest inheritance;—what else had we worthy of our care? Liberty was the essence of the British constitution. King, lords, commons, and courts of judicature, were but the forms; the basis of the constitution was liberty, that grand and beautiful fabric, the first principle of which was government by law, and which this day they were going to suspend.

[I]f difference of opinion were a cause of withholding sympathy and compassion, this would indeed be a dismal world to inhabit. Difference of opinion was, in his mind, one great cause of the improvement of mankind, because it led to inquiry and discussion. It was his opinion that in all points, civil and religious, toleration of opinion was wisdom; upon that depended all the peace, he had almost said all the virtue, and consequently all the happiness of the world. This humane doctrine was the great leading feature of the mild and beneficent system of Christianity, and what had tended to render it such an inestimable blessing to mankind.

Was it not a situation of the country horrible to relate, that men's correspondence and conversation were to be pried into with such inquisitorial jealousy, as to make it dangerous for them to commit their thoughts to paper, or to converse with a stranger but in the presence of a third person? Let the House do away all these suspicions and rumours by an honest inquiry, and restore the public to that freedom and confidence, both of writing and speech, which it was the pride of our constitution to bestow, and which became the frank and open character of a free people.

The people had been told by their representatives in parliament that they were surrounded with dangers, and had been shewn none. They were, therefore, full of suspicion and prompt of belief. All this had a material tendency to impede freedom of discussion, for men would speak with reserve, or not speak at all, under the terror of calumny.

Any thing that proves that it is not in the power of Kings and Princes by their great armies to have every thing their own way is of such good example that without any good will to the French one can not help being delighted by it, and you know I have a natural partiality to what some people call rebels.

Where could be found finer sentiments of liberty, than in the works of Demosthenes and Cicero? Where should we meet with bolder assertions of the rights of mankind, and the dignity of human nature, than in the historians Tacitus and Thucydides?

[H]e thought one of the most splendid triumphs of Christianity was, its having caused slavery to be so generally abolished, as soon as ever it appeared in the world. One obvious ground on which it did this, was by teaching us, that in the sight of Heaven all mankind are equal. The same effect might be expected also from the general principles which it taught. Its powerful influence appeared to have done more in this respect than all the ancient systems of philosophy; though even in them, in point of theory, we might trace great liberality and consideration for human rights.

Toleration in religion was one of the great rights of man, and a man ought never to be deprived of what was his natural right.

[H]e was indebted to his right honourable friend <nowiki>[</nowiki>Edmund Burke<nowiki>]</nowiki> for the greatest share of the political knowledge he possessed,—his political education had been formed under him,—his instructions had invariably governed his principles.

Persecution always said, "I know the consequences of your opinion better than you know them yourselves." But the language of toleration was always amicable, liberal, and just; it confessed its doubts, and acknowledged its ignorance. It said, "Though I dislike your opinions, because I think them dangerous, yet, since you profess such opinions, I will not believe you can think such dangerous inferences flow from them, which strike my attention so forcibly." This was truly a just and legitimate mode of reasoning, always less liable to error, and more adapted to human affairs. When we argued à posteriori, judging from the fruit to the tree, from the effect to the cause, we were not so subject to deviate into error and falsehood, as when we pursued the contrary method of argument. Yet, persecution had always reasoned from cause to effect, from opinion to action, which proved generally erroneous; while toleration led us invariably to form just conclusions, by judging from actions and not from opinions.

To suppose a man wicked or immoral, merely on account of any difference of religious opinion, was as false as it was absurd; yet this was the original principle of persecution.