John Stuart Mill understood the word existence in a material and empirical sense; he meant that in defining a circle we assert that there are round things in nature.
In this form his opinion is inadmissible. Mathematics is independent of the existence of material objects. In mathematics the word exist can only have one meaning; it signifies exemption from contradiction. Thus rectified, Mill's thought becomes accurate. In defining an object, we assert that the definition involves no contradiction.
French mathematician, physicist and engineer (1854–1912)
Jules Henri Poincaré (29 April 1854 – 17 July 1912), generally known as Henri Poincaré, was one of France's greatest mathematicians and theoretical physicists, and a philosopher of science.
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Alternative Names:
Jules Henri Poincare
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Henri Poincare
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Poincare
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Jules Henri Poincaré
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Poincaré
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It is impossible to study the works of the great mathematicians, or even those of the lesser, without noticing and distinguishing two opposite tendencies, or rather two entirely different kinds of minds. The one sort are above all preoccupied with logic; to read their works, one is tempted to believe they have advanced only step by step, after the manner of a Vauban who pushes on his trenches against the place besieged, leaving nothing to chance. The other sort are guided by intuition and at the first stroke make quick but sometimes precarious conquests, like bold cavalrymen of the advance guard.
[1913, p210]
The axioms of geometry, therefore, are neither synthetic a priori judgments nor experimental facts.
They are conventions; our choice among all possible conventions is guided by experimental facts; but it remains free and is limited only by the necessity of avoiding all contradiction. . . .
In other words, the axioms of geometry (I do not speak of those of arithmetic) are merely disguised definitions.
Then what are we to think of that question: Is the Euclidean geometry true?
It has no meaning.
As well ask whether the metric system is true and the old measures false.
What we call geometry is nothing but the study of formal properties of a certain continuous group; so that we may say, space is a group. The notion of this continuous group exists in our mind prior to all experience; but the assertion is no less true of the notion of many other continuous groups; for example, that which corresponds to the geometry of Lobatchevski.
Are the laws of acceleration and composition of forces nothing but arbitrary conventions? Conventions, yes; arbitrary, no; they would seem arbitrary if we forgot the experiences which guided the founders of science to their adoption and which are, although imperfect, sufficient to justify them. Sometimes it is useful to turn our attention to the experimental origin of these conventions.
Le plus grand hasard est la naissance d’un grand homme. Ce n’est que par hasard que se sont rencontrées deux cellules génitales, de sexe différent, qui contenaient précisément, chacune de son côté, les éléments mystérieux dont la réaction mutuelle devait produire le génie. On tombera d’accord que ces éléments doivent être rares et que leur rencontre est encore plus rare. Qu’il aurait fallu peu de chose pour dévier de sa route le spermatozoïde qui les portait ; il aurait suffi de le dévier d’un dixième de millimètre et Napoléon ne naissait pas et les destinées d’un continent étaient changées. Nul exemple ne peut mieux faire comprendre les véritables caractères du hasard.
If... it be supposed that another way of measuring time is adopted... enunciation of the law would be... translated into another language... much less simple. So that the definition implicitly adopted by the astronomers may be summed up..: Time should be so defined that the equations of mechanics may be as simple as possible... [i.e.,] there is not one way of measuring time more true... only more convenient.
Consider now the Milky Way. Here also we see an innumerable dust, only the grains of this dust are no longer atoms but stars; these grains also move with great velocities, they act at a distance one upon another, but this action is so slight at great distances that their trajectories are rectilineal; nevertheless, from time to time, two of them may come near enough together to be deviated from their course, like a comet that passed too close to Jupiter. In a word, in the eyes of a giant, to whom our Suns were what our atoms are to us, the Milky Way would only look like a bubble of gas.
Or... they observe an astronomic phenomenon... an eclipse of the moon, and... suppose... this... is perceived simultaneously from all points of the earth. That is not altogether true, since the propagation of light is not instantaneous; if absolute exactitude were desired, there would be a correction... according to a complicated rule.
Every conclusion supposes premises; these premises themselves either are self-evident and need no demonstration, or can be established only by relying upon other propositions, and since we can not go back thus to infinity, every deductive science, and in particular geometry, must rest on a certain number of undemonstrable axioms.
Is the position tenable, that certain phenomena, possible in Euclidean space, would be impossible in non-Euclidean space, so that experience, in establishing these phenomena, would directly contradict the non-Euclidean hypothesis? For my part I think no such question can be put. To my mind it is precisely equivalent to the following, whose absurdity is patent to all eyes: are there lengths expressible in meters and centimeters, but which can not be measured in fathoms, feet, and inches, so that experience, in ascertaining the existence of these lengths, would directly contradict the hypothesis that there are fathoms divided into six feet?