Michael S. Gazzaniga Quotes

How on earth does lifeless matter become the building blocks for living things? How do neurons turn into minds? What should be the vocabulary used to describe the interactions between the brain and its mind? When humankind finds some answers, will we be disheartened by what they are? Will our future understanding of “consciousness” simply not be fulfilling? Will it be simple yet cold and harsh?

THE HUMAN INTERPRETER HAS SET US UP FOR A FALL. IT has created the illusion of self and, with it, the sense we humans have agency and “freely” make decisions about our actions. In many ways it is a terrific and positive capacity for humans to possess. With increasing intelligence and with a capacity to see relationships beyond what is immediately and perceptually apparent, how long would it be before our species began to wonder what it all meant — what was the meaning of life? The interpreter provides the storyline and narrative, and we all believe we are agents acting

While there are more neural connections within a half brain than between the two halves, there are still massive connections across the hemispheres. Even so, cutting those connections does little to one’s sense of conscious experience. That is to say, the left hemisphere keeps on talking and thinking as if nothing had happened even though it no longer has access to half of the human cortex. More important, disconnecting the two half brains instantly creates a second, also independent conscious system. The right brain now purrs along carefree from the left, with its own capacities, desires, goals, insights, and feelings. One network, split into two, becomes two conscious systems. How could one possibly think that consciousness arises from a particular specific network? We need a new idea to cope with this fact.

Evolutionary theories allowed materialist theories of consciousness to come in two flavors: emergentism and panpsychism. The former proposes that consciousness emerges from unconscious matter once that matter achieves a certain level of complexity or organization. Sperry was leaning heavily in this direction. The latter, panpsychism, tosses the whole problem out by suggesting that all matter has subjective consciousness, albeit in a wide range of types. The idea here is that there is no need for the idea of emergence and complexity to explain consciousness. Consciousness is a primordial feature of all things, from rocks to ants to us.

Nagel states that “an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism — something it is like for the organism.” “Like” does not mean “resemble,” such as in the question “What is ice skating like? Is it like roller skating?” Instead, it concerns the subjective qualitative feel of the experience, that is, what it feels like for the subject: “What is ice skating like for you?” (For instance, is it exhilarating?) Nagel called this the “subjective character of experience.” It has also been called “phenomenal consciousness,” and, although he doesn’t say it, it is also referred to as qualia.

Do the lingering ideas of the past block us from seeing clearly how it comes about? Is consciousness just what brains do? Just as a pocket watch with all of its gears tells us the time, do brains with all their neurons just give us consciousness? The history of the topic is vast, swept by pendulum swings between the pure mechanists and the hopeful mentalists. Surprisingly, twenty-five hundred years of human history have not resolved the question or taught our species how to frame an understanding of our personal conscious experience. Indeed, our core ideas have not changed that much. While thinking explicitly about consciousness was ignited by Descartes three hundred years ago, two overarching and contradictory notions — that the mind either is part of the brain’s workings or works somehow independently of the brain — have been around seemingly forever. Indeed, these ideas are still with us.

In order to know the actual location of the electron, a measurement must be made, and here is where the troubles begin for the die-hard determinists. Once a measurement is made, the quantum state is said to collapse, meaning that all the other possible states the electron could have been in (known as superpositions) have collapsed into one. All the other possibilities have been eliminated. The measurement, of course, was irreversible and had constrained the system by causing the collapse. Over the next couple of years physicists realized that neither the classical concept of “particle” nor that of “wave” could fully describe the behavior of quantum-scale objects at any one point in time. As Feynman quipped, “They don’t behave like a wave or like a particle, they behave quantum mechanically.”18

Emergence is when micro-level complex systems that are far from equilibrium (thus allowing for the amplification of random events) self-organize (creative, self-generated, adaptability-seeking behavior) into new structures, with new properties that previously did not exist, to form a new level of organization on the macro level.

What if conscious experience is managed by each module? Lose a module to injury or stroke, and the consciousness that accompanies that module is gone, too. Remember: patients with hemi-neglect aren’t conscious of one-half of space because the module that processes that information is no longer working. Or, if the modules responsible for locating oneself in space are not being integrated properly, conscious experience is deeply affected, and one ends up with the feeling that someone else is there just over your shoulder. Or, take people with Urbach-Wiethe disease, which leads to deterioration of the amygdalae: they no longer experience the emotion of fear.

second point is how to think about the very concept of personal responsibility in a mechanistic and social world. It is a given that all network systems, social or mechanical, need accountability in order to work.

Dennett handles this problem by denying it. He laments that one of the problems with explaining consciousness is that we all think we are consciousness experts, and have very strong beliefs about it, just because we have experienced it. He complains that this doesn’t happen to vision researchers. Even though most of us can see, we don’t think we are vision experts. Dennett claims that consciousness is the result of a bag of tricks: our subjective experience is an illusion, a very believable one, one that we fall for every time, even when it has been explained to us how it comes about physically, just like some optical illusions that still fool us even though we know how they work.

Recently, researchers captured an unbelievable picture of a small group of photons as waves and another group behaving as particles at the same time.14 Although the idea of complementarity is now established in physics, it is not widely seen as a possible foundational idea for thinking about the mind/brain explanatory gap. I think it should be, and first want to look at how physics came to accept its seemingly puzzling reality. Following its acceptance in physics, the idea of complementarity may prove itself to be key to thinking about biology, and about the mind/brain gap in particular.

Recently scientists have found that cephalopods (the family that contains the octopus) can recode their RNA. RNA molecules have the privilege of establishing codes with DNA (in the part of the RNA that recognizes the three-nucleotide DNA codon sequence) and also with proteins (in the separate part of the RNA that recognizes the amino acid). Recoding the RNA means that new proteins can be constructed while the DNA sequence of symbols stays the same. The collective result is the destruction of the one-to-one gene-to-protein correspondence. Recoding allows a single octopus gene to produce many different types of proteins from the same DNA sequence.18 This is a big deal. It is evidence against the three concepts in biology that dismiss semiotic systems in living organisms. The system can change its code. The system has an internal codemaker that can produce biological innovations — new proteins — but not via natural selection. It illustrates the arbitrariness of the connection of a symbol with its meaning in a living system. If symbols within living systems

It was also the test that produced the most astounding observation of all. The left, talking brain didn’t seem to miss the right brain, and vice versa. It didn’t just not miss it — it didn’t even remember it or the functions it had performed, as if the right hemisphere had never existed. For me, this phenomenon is the single most important fact students of mind/brain research must take into account.

Marc Kirschner and his Berkeley colleague John Gerhart.20 They wondered whether modern creatures have cellular and developmental mechanisms with the characteristic of what is called evolvability. That is, do they have the ability to generate heritable phenotypic variation? And is the characteristic of evolvability itself under selection pressure? That is, will biological systems that produce more phenotypic variations that can be passed on to their offspring be more