German-Swiss psychiatrist and philosopher (1883–1969)
Karl Theodor Jaspers (23 February 1883 – 26 February 1969) was a German psychiatrist and philosopher. Among his most well known contributions is his idea of the Axial Age [Achsenzeit].
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Native Name:
Karl Theodor Jaspers
Alternative Names:
Karl Theodor Jasper
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My path was not the normal one of professors of philosophy. I did not intend to become a doctor of philosophy by studying philosophy (I am in fact a doctor of medicine) nor did I by any means, intend originally to qualify for a professorship by a dissertation on philosophy. To decide to become a philosopher seemed as foolish to me as to decide to become a poet. Since my schooldays, however, I was guided by philosophical questions. Philosophy seemed to me the supreme, even the sole, concern of man. Yet a certain awe kept me from making it my profession.
Three things are required at a university: professional training, education of the whole man, research. For the university is simultaneously a professional school, a cultural center and a research institute. People have tried to force the university to choose between these three possibilities. They have asked what it is that we really expect the university to do. Since, so they say, it cannot do everything it ought to decide upon one of these three alternatives. It was even suggested that the university as such be dissolved, to be replaced by three special types of school: institutes for professional training, institutes for general education possibly involving a special staff, and research institutes. In the idea of the university, however, these three are indissolubly united. One cannot be cut off from the others without destroying the intellectual substance of the university, and without at the same time crippling itself. All three are factors of a living whole. By isolating them, the spirit of the university perishes.
But each one of us is guilty insofar as he remained inactive. The guilt of passivity is different. Impotence excuses; no moral law demands a spectacular death. Plato already deemed it a matter of course to go into hiding in desperate times of calamity, and to survive. But passivity knows itself morally guilty of every failure, every neglect to act whenever possible, to shield the imperiled, to relieve wrong, to countervail. Impotent submission always left a margin of activity which, though not without risk, could still be cautiously effective. Its anxious omission weighs upon the individual as moral guilt. Blindness for the misfortune of others, lack of imagination of the heart, inner differences toward the witnessed evil — that is moral guilt.
For one wishing to philosophize, it is particular, indeed of crucial importance to ascertain the difference between the object cognition that is achieved in the sciences and the transcending thought that characterizes philosophy......which transcend[s] the limits of the knowable and of the world as a whole, so that through these limits we become aware of the phenomenality of empirical existence and hence of the Comprehensive nature of being, thus entering into the area of faith.
Man's primary will to know struggles against the selfsatisfied formalism of empty learning which drugs man into
the illusory calm of fulfillment. It fights against empty intellectualism,
against nihilism which has ceased wanting anything and thus has ceased wanting to know. It battles against mediocrity which never takes stock of itself and which confuses knowledge with the mere learning of facts and <> The only satisfaction which man derives from a radical commitment to knowledge is the hope of advancing the frontier of knowledge to a point beyond which he cannot advance except by transcending knowledge itself.
Je však nesmyslné morálně obviňovat nějaký národ jako celek. Není národního charakteru v tom smyslu, že by jej sdílel každý jednotlivý příslušník národa. Existuje ovšem společenství jazyka, mravů, obyčejů a původu. Ale v něm jsou zároveň možné tak velké rozdíly, že lidé, kteří hovoří touže řečí, si v ní přece mohou zůstávat tak cizí, jako by vůbec nepatřili k témuž národu.
Morálně lze vždy posuzovat jen jednotlivce, nikdy ne kolektiv.
Ale morální a metafyzická vina, již chápe jen jedinec ve svém společenství jako svou vinu, se neodpykává (jak vyplývá z její podstaty). Nepřestává. Kdo ji má, vstupuje do procesu, který potrvá po celý jeho život.
Pro nás Němce tu platí alternativa: Bud se přijetí oné viny - kterou nemají ostatní na mysli, ale kterou stále znovu vyslovuje naše svědomí – stane základním rysem našeho německého sebeuvědomění, a pak půjde naše duše cestou proměny, nebo klesneme do lhostejné průměrnosti pouhého žití.
There exists among men, because they are men, a solidarity through which each shares responsibility for every injustice and every wrong committed in the world, and especially for crimes that are committed in his presence or of which he cannot be ignorant. If I do not do whatever I can to prevent them, I am an accomplice in them. If I have not risked my life in order to prevent the murder of other men, if I have stood silent, I feel guilty in a sense that cannot in any adequate fashion be understood juridically, or politically, or morally ... That I am still alive after such things have been done weighs on me as a guilt that cannot be expiated.
Somewhere in the heart of human relations an absolute command imposes itself: In case of criminal attack or of living conditions that threaten physical being, accept life only for all together, otherwise not at all.