The brutes, which have only their bodies to conserve, are continually occupied in seeking sources of nourishment; but men, of whom the chief part is the mind, ought to make the search after wisdom their principal care, for wisdom is the true nourishment of the mind; and I feel assured, moreover, that there are very many who would not fail in the search, if they would but hope for success in it, and knew the degree of their capabilities for it.

"In everyday life we must often act without delay, it is a most certain truth that when it is not in our power to discern the truest opinions, we must follow the most probable." (Discourse III, AT VI: 25/CSM I: 123)

[Descartes discusses a traveler lost in a forest to illustrate this. The traveler is lost, and he does not know how to get out of the woods. Descartes’ advice is that the traveler should pick a route, even if it is uncertain, and resolutely stick to it:

"Keep walking as straight as he can in one direction, never changing it for slight reasons even if mere chance made him choose it in the first place; for in this way, even if he does not go exactly where he wishes, he will at least end up in a place where he is likely to be better off than in the middle of a forest." (Ibid.)]

regarding speculative matters that are of no practical moment, and followed by no consequences to himself, farther, perhaps, than that they foster his vanity the better the more remote they are from common sense; requiring, as they must in this case, the exercise of greater ingenuity and art to render them probable.

I was especially delighted with the mathematics, on account of the certitude and evidence of their reasonings; but I had not as yet a precise knowledge of their true use; and thinking that they but contributed to the advancement of the mechanical arts, I was astonished that foundations, so strong and solid, should have had no loftier superstructure reared on them.

Υποθέτω ότι το σώμα δεν είναι παρά ένα άγαλμα ή μια μηχανή από πηλό, την οποία ο Θεός δημιουργεί με σαφή πρόθεση να μοιαζει όσο το δυνατόν περισσότερο με εμάς.

Tüm yöntem aklın birtakım gerçeklere varmak için çabasını yönlendirmek zorunda olduğu konuların sırasına ve konumuna dayanır. Bunu sürdürebilmek için güçlük içeren ve muğlak önermeleri aşamalı olarak daha basite indirgemek, sonra da bunların sezgisinden hareket ederek aynı şekilde diğer önermelerin bilgisine varmak gerekir.

Finally, if there still are men who have not been sufficiently persuaded
of the existence of God and of their soul by means of the reasons I have
brought forward, I very much want them to know that all the other things
of which they think themselves perhaps more assured, such as having a
body, that there are stars and an earth, and the like, are less certain. For
although one might have a moral assurance about these things, which is
such that it seems one cannot doubt them without being extravagant, still
when it is a question of metaphysical certitude, it seems unreasonable for
anyone to deny that there is not a sufficient basis for one's being completely
assured about them, when one observes that while asleep one can, in the
same fashion, imagine that one has a different body and that one sees
different stars and a different earth, without any of these things being
the case. For how does one know that the thoughts that come to us in
dreams are any more false than the others, given that they are often no
less vivid and explicit? And even if the best minds study this as much as
they please, I do not believe they can give any reason sufficient to remove
this doubt, unless they presuppose the existence of God. For first of all,
even what I have already taken for a rule, namely that the things we very
clearly and very distinctly conceive are all true, is assured only for the
reason that God is or exists, and that he is a perfect being, and that all
that is in us comes from him.

Et nous appellerons ces choses indéfinies plutôt qu'infinies, afin de réserver à Dieu seul le nom d'infini, tant à cause que nous ne remarquons point de bornes en ses perfections, comme aussi à cause que nous somme très assurés qu'il n'y en peut avoir. Pour ce qui est des autres choses, nous savons qu'elles ne sont pas ainsi absolument parfaites, parce qu'encore que nous y remarquions quelquefois des propriétés qui nous semblent n'avoir point de limites, nous ne laissons pas de connoitre que cela procède du défaut de notre entendement, et non point de leur nature.