hay pocas personas que consientan en decir lo que creen, sino también porque muchas lo ignoran, pues el acto del pensamiento, por el cual uno cree una cosa, es diferente de aquel otro por el cual uno conoce que la cree, y por lo tanto muchas veces se encuentra aquél sin éste.

I shall then suppose, not that God who is supremely good and the fountain of truth, but some evil genius not less powerful than deceitful, has employed his whole energies in deceiving me; I shall consider that the heavens, the earth, colours, figures, sound, and all other external things are nought but the illusions and dreams of which this genius has availed himself in order to lay traps for my credulity; I shall consider myself as having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, nor any senses, yet falsely believing myself to possess all these things; I shall remain obstinately attached to this idea, and if by this means it is not in my power to arrive at the knowledge of any truth, I may at least do what is in my power [i.e. suspend my judgment], and with firm purpose avoid giving credence to any false thing, or being imposed upon by this arch deceiver, however powerful and deceptive he may be.

Finally, if there still are men who have not been sufficiently persuaded
of the existence of God and of their soul by means of the reasons I have
brought forward, I very much want them to know that all the other things
of which they think themselves perhaps more assured, such as having a
body, that there are stars and an earth, and the like, are less certain. For
although one might have a moral assurance about these things, which is
such that it seems one cannot doubt them without being extravagant, still
when it is a question of metaphysical certitude, it seems unreasonable for
anyone to deny that there is not a sufficient basis for one's being completely
assured about them, when one observes that while asleep one can, in the
same fashion, imagine that one has a different body and that one sees
different stars and a different earth, without any of these things being
the case. For how does one know that the thoughts that come to us in
dreams are any more false than the others, given that they are often no
less vivid and explicit? And even if the best minds study this as much as
they please, I do not believe they can give any reason sufficient to remove
this doubt, unless they presuppose the existence of God. For first of all,
even what I have already taken for a rule, namely that the things we very
clearly and very distinctly conceive are all true, is assured only for the
reason that God is or exists, and that he is a perfect being, and that all
that is in us comes from him.

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Así como la existencia del yo ha sido, en el cogito, establecida por una intuición intelectual, también la existencia de Dios queda establecida en el argumento ontológico por medio de una deducción (que para Descartes es una serie de intuiciones intelectuales). La metafísica del cartesianismo y filosofías subsiguientes tienden, por modo inevitable, a demostrar las existencias, mediante actos intelectuales subjetivos.

Πράγματι, δεν αρκεί να διαθέτουμε ισχυρό πνέυμα: σημασία έχει να ξέρουμε να το χρησιμοποιούμε σωστά. Τα μεγαλύτερα πνεύματα μπορεί να έχουν τα σοβαρότερα ελαττώματα όπως και τις σπουδαιότερες αρετές, και εκείνοι που προχωρούν πολύ αργά, αν ακολουθούν πάντα τον σωστό δρόμο, μπορούν να διανύσουν μια διαδρομή πολύ μεγαλύτερη απ' ό,τι εκείνοι που τρέχουν, όμως απομακρύνονται από αυτόν.

Εκείνοι που έχουν μεγαλύτερη συλλογιστική ικανότητα και επεξεργάζονται καλύτερα τις σκέψεις τους, προκειμένου να τις καταστήσουν σαφείς και κατανοητές, μπορούν πάντα να κάνουν πιο πειστικά τα λεγόμενα τους, έστω και αν δεν μιλούν.

punto de partida es la duda metódica. La duda cartesiana no es escepticismo, sino un procedimiento dialéctico de investigación, encaminado a desprender y aislar la primera verdad evidente, la primera idea clara y distinta, la primera naturaleza simple.