The ontology of materialism rested upon the illusion that the kind of existence, the direct 'actuality' of the world around us, can be extrapolated into the atomic range. This extrapolation, however, is impossible... Atoms are not things.

The existing scientific concepts cover always only a very limited part of reality,
and the other part that has not yet been understood is infinite. Whenever we
proceed from the known into the unknown we may hope to understand, but we
may have to learn at the same time a new meaning of the word ‘understanding’.

Revere those things beyond science which really matter and about which it is so difficult to speak.

In a darkened world no longer illuminated by the light of this center [God], technical advances are scarcely more than despairing attempts to make Hell a more agreeable place to live in. This must be particularly emphasized against those who think that by spreading the civilization of science and technology even to the uttermost ends of the earth, they can furnish all the essential preconditions for a golden age. One cannot escape the Devil so easily as that.

[S]ets of concepts... defined in physics. ...[F]our systems... have ...attained ...final form.
The first ...Newtonian mechanics ...for the description of all mechanical systems, ...motion of fluids and ...elastic ..; it comprises , , aerodynamics.
The second closed system of concepts... the theory of heat. Though... connected with mechanics through... statistical mechanics, it... [is] not... a part of mechanics. ...[T]he phenomenological theory of heat uses ...[some] concepts that have no [physics] counterpart ...like: , specific heat, entropy, free energy, etc. ...[F]rom ...phenomenological ...to a statistical interpretation ...considering heat as energy, distributed statistically among ...many degrees of freedom due to ...atomic structure... heat is no more connected with mechanics than with electrodynamics or other ...physics. The central concept ...is ...probability, closely connected with ...entropy ...Besides this ...the statistical theory of heat requires the concept of energy. But any coherent set ...in physics will ...contain ...concepts of energy, and and the law that these ...be conserved. This follows if the ...set is ...to describe ...features ...correct at all times and everywhere; ...[i.e.,] features that do not depend on space and time ...[i.e.,] are invariant under arbitrary translations in space and time, rotations in space and the Galileo— or Lorentz—transformation. Therefore, the theory of heat can be combined with any of the other closed systems of concepts.
The third... electricity and magnetism... reached... final form... through... Lorentz, Einstein and Minkowski. It comprises electrodynamics, special relativity, optics, magnetism, and one may include the de Broglie theory of s of all different sorts of elementary particles, but not the wave theory of Schrodinger.
[F]ourth... the quantum theory... Its central concept is the probability function, or... "statistical matrix"... It comprises quantum and wave mechanics, the theory of atomic spectra, chemistry, and the theory of other properties... like electric conductivity, , etc.
...The first set is contained in the third as the limiting case where the velocity of light can be considered as infinitely big, and is contained in the fourth as the limiting case where of action can be considered as infinitely small. The first and partly the third set belong to the fourth as a priori for the description of the experiments. The second set can be connected with any of the other three sets without difficulty and is especially important in its connection with the fourth. The independent existence of the third and fourth sets suggests the existence of a fifth set, of which one, three, and four are limiting cases. This fifth set will probably be found someday in connection with the theory of the elementary particles.

However the development proceeds in detail, the path so far traced by the quantum theory indicates that an understanding of those still unclarified features of atomic physics can only be acquired by foregoing visualization and objectification to an extent greater than that customary hitherto. We have probably no reason to regret this, because the thought of the great epistemological difficulties with which the visual atom concept of earlier physics had to contend gives us the hope that the abstracter atomic physics developing at present will one day fit more harmoniously into the great edifice of Science.

Only a few know, how much one must know, to know how little one knows

The atoms in the philosophy of do not move merely by chance. Leucippus seems to have believed in complete determinism, since he is known to have said: "Naught happens for nothing, but everything from a ground and of necessity." The atomists did not give any reason for the original motion of the atoms, which just shows that they thought of a causal description of the atomic motion; causality can only explain later events by earlier events, but it can never explain the beginning.

[I]n the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory we can indeed proceed without mentioning ourselves as individuals, but we cannot disregard the fact that natural science is formed by men. Natural science does not simply describe and explain nature; it is part of the interplay between nature and ourselves; it describes nature as exposed to our nature of questioning. This was a possibility of which Descartes could not have thought, but it makes a sharp separation between the world and the I impossible.

If one follows the great difficulty which even eminent scientists like Einstein had in understanding and accepting the Copenhagen interpretation... one can trace the roots... to the Cartesian partition....it will take a long time for it [this partition] to be replaced by a really different attitude toward the problem of reality.

There is an enormous difference between modern science and Greek philosophy, and that is just the empiristic attitude... Since the time of Galileo and Newton, modern science has been based upon a detailed study of nature and upon the postulate that only such statements should be made, as have been verified or at least can be verified by experiment. The idea that one can single out some events from nature by an experiment... to find out what is the constant law in the continuous change, did not occur to the Greek philosophers. Therefore, modern science has from its beginning stood on a much more modest, but at the same time much firmer, basis than ancient philosophy. Therefore, the statements of modern physics are in some way meant much more seriously than the statements of Greek philosophy.

The law of causality is no longer applied in quantum theory and the law of conservation of matter is no longer true for the elementary particles. Obviously Kant could not have foreseen the new discoveries, but since he was convinced that his concepts would be "the basis of any future metaphysics that can be called science" it is interesting to see where his arguments have been wrong.

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But the resemblance of the modern views to those of Plato and the Pythagoreans can be carried somewhat further. The elementary particles in Plato's Timaeus are finally not substance but mathematical forms. "All things are numbers" is a sentence attributed to Pythagoras. The only mathematical forms available at that time were such geometric forms as the regular solids or the triangles which form their surface. In modern quantum theory there can be no doubt that the elementary particles will finally also be mathematical forms but of a much more complicated nature.

[E]ven in the most precise part of science, in mathematics, we cannot avoid using concepts that involve contradictions. ...[I]t is well known that the concept of infinity leads to contradictions... but it would be practically impossible to construct... mathematics without this concept.