Taken as a whole, this constitutes the Idea of Spinoza, and it is just what pure being was to the Eleatics (Vol. 1. pp. 244, 252). This Idea of Spino… - Benedictus de Spinoza

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Taken as a whole, this constitutes the Idea of Spinoza, and it is just what pure being was to the Eleatics (Vol. 1. pp. 244, 252). This Idea of Spinoza's we must allow to be in the main true and well-grounded; absolute substance is the truth, but it is not the whole truth; in order to be this it must also be thought of as in itself active and living, and by that very means it must determine itself as mind. But substance with Spinoza is only the universal and consequently the abstract determination of mind; it may undoubtedly be said that this thought is the foundation of all true views — not, however, as their absolutely fixed and permanent basis, but as the abstract unity which mind is in itself. It is therefore worthy of note that thought must begin by placing itself at the standpoint of Spinozism; to be a follower of Spinoza is the essential commencement of all Philosophy. For as we saw above (Vol. I. p. 144), when man begins to philosophize, the soul must commence by bathing in this ether of the One Substance, in which all that man has held as true has disappeared; this negation of all that is particular, to which every philosopher must have come, is the liberation of the mind and its absolute foundation. The difference between our standpoint and that of the Eleatic philosophy is only this, that through the agency of Christianity concrete individuality is in the modern world present throughout in spirit. But in spite of the infinite demands on the part of the concrete, substance with Spinoza is not yet determined as in itself concrete. As the concrete is thus not present in the content of substance, it is therefore to be found within reflecting thought alone, and it is only from the endless oppositions of this last that the required unity emerges. Of substance as such there is nothing more to be said; all that we can do is to speak of the different ways in which Philosophy has dealt with it, and the opposites which in it are abrogated. The difference depends on the nature of the opposites which are held to be abrogated in substance. Spinoza is far from having proved this unity as convincingly as was done by the ancients; but what constitutes the grandeur of Spinoza's manner of thought is that he is able to renounce all that is determinate and particular, and restrict himself to the One, giving heed to this alone.

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About Benedictus de Spinoza

Benedictus de Spinoza (24 November 1632 – 21 February 1677) was a social and metaphysical philosopher known for the elaborate development of his monist philosophy, which has become known as Spinozism. Controversy regarding his ideas led to his excommunication from the Jewish community of his native Amsterdam. He was named Baruch ("blessed" in Hebrew) Spinoza by his synagogue elders and known as Bento de Spinoza or Bento d'Espiñoza, but afterwards used the name Benedictus ("blessed" in Latin) de Spinoza.

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Also Known As

Native Name: בָּרוּךְ שְׂפִּינוֹזָה Benedito de Espinosa
Alternative Names: Benedict de Spinoza Baruch de Espinosa Barukh Shpinozah Benoît de Spinoza Sbīnūzā Ispīnūzā Barukh Spinoza Bento de Espinosa Baruch d' Espinoza Shpinozah Baruch de Spinoza Spinoza Benoit de Spinoza Benedictus De Spinoza Benedictus Spinoza Baruch Spinoza Baruch Benedictus de Spinoza

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[Jérome Skalski's question: Wasn't Spinoza also a thinker of radical democracy? Philosophically, was Althusserian Marxism also a return to Spinoza?] Althusser admired the Spinoza of the Theological-Political Treatise, but that was not the aspect that interested him the most. You are absolutely right to say that Spinoza's thought is a radically democratic thought. This is a dimension that has come to the forefront for a while now, and which has been appropriated by a broad variety of philosophers some of whom effectively come from a Marxist background. However, this was not the aspect or dimension that interested Althusser. Not because he was hostile towards it, but because he fundamentally thought that radical democracy was a transition, an intermediary stage towards the dictatorship of the proletariat. From this point of view, he was a very orthodox Marxist. The dimension that he emphasized in Spinoza concerned the theory of ideology. With Spinoza, there is the first great materialist critique of ideology. Althusser defended a paradoxical thesis. I understand that it forcefully shocked many Marxists at the time but, on the other hand, it was very attractive to certain people among us. This idea was that the concept of ideology was the fundamental aspect of Marx's theoretical revolution: not only the critique of bourgeois ideology, but the critique of ideology in general. To Althusser, this also appeared to be an important point within the debates internal to Communism at the time, in that it was dominated by the ideological complex he called humanism and economism. He thought that the Marxist tradition was weak on the question of ideology and that Marx, even if he possessed the genius to invent the concept, had had a very bad analysis of it. In Spinoza, he found the elements for a materialist theory of ideology that was neither Feuerbachian or Hegelian, and was not attached to a philosophy of history or to the concept of an alienation of man or a human essence. All of this paired very well with what was called Althusser’s scientism, such as it was expressed in the idea of the epistemological break and led to his proximity with structuralism. Althusser quickly criticized these positions in his Elements of Self-Criticism.

Spinoza remained throughout his life, and well into the eighteenth century, a thinker whom one could admire only in secret, hiding one's sympathy just as his Marrano antecedents had concealed their wayward Jewishness. Open admiration could destroy even the most established of reputations, well into the eighteenth century's so-called Age of Reason. In the 1780s, for example, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi launched a generalized attack on Enlightenment thought by claiming that the late poet Lessing had been a closet Spinozist, a charge sufficient to compromise the entire movement for which Lessing had been a leading spokesman. Jacobi even went after Immanuel Kant and his successors, arguing that "consistent philosophy is Spinozist, hence pantheist, fatalist, and atheist."

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