Top 13 Alexandre Kojève Quotes

A Revolution is nothing other than the replacement of one given type of Authority with another.

In all times and ages, political crimes have always been punished more severely than others – even in the degenerate State of Nicholas II. The fact that in modern 'democracies' we lean towards political clemency proves only one thing: the loss of any sense of the 'political' in general.

There has to be a risk of the death sentence in order for 'mastery' to exist.

It is from Eternity that the representatives of God on earth derive their Authority.

The Authority of the 'man of the moment' pertains to the fact that it is he, par excellence, who represents 'actuality', the Present, the 'real presence' of something in the world (Hegel's Gegenwart), as opposed to the 'poetic' unreality of the past and the 'utopian' unreality of the future.

True, since the Minority is necessarily weaker (physically, that is to say quantitatively) than the Majority, its power can only derive from its Authority (minority regimes are necessarily 'authoritarian'). But this Authority never derives from the fact that the Minority is a Minority. The 'justification' ('propaganda') is always of the kind: "even though we are only a minority, we . . ." The Authority that is endorsed by a Minority 'justifies' itself or explains itself by 'quality' and not by quantity. (Even the 'snob' claims to belong to the elite and not to the minority.)

As for the Minority, its very existence proves that it does not recognise the Authority of the Majority, since forming a minority means precisely being opposed to the majority, and so 'reacting' (in one way or another) against its acts. But, where there is no Authority, 'reactions' can only be removed by force. Therefore, wherever the Majority claims a sui generis would-be 'Authority' resulting form its sheer number, it is in fact claiming pure and simple force. (A regime that is based purely and solely on a majority is a regime founded on force only. The 'majority' regime can therefore be contrasted with the 'authoritarian' one; the latter rests on Authority, while the former rests on force.)

Obviously, absolute Authority in the strong sense of the word is never realised in fact. Only God is held to possess it.

God is always, more or less, a custodian God: He is some sort of a 'cause' to the social or political group that 'recognises' His Authority. He is the one who guarantees continuity ('filiation') – that is to say, the unity of the group – and fixes its 'personality', its 'individuality' (that is distinct from others), by determining its origin. Hence the 'traditional' character of the divinity of the (sacred) divine: God is always the God of ancestors ('the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob'). Hence also the (sacred) divine character of every 'tradition': the past that determines the present is generally reduced, eventually, to a divine origin.

Given that God incarnates the summum of authority, it is no surprise that we find in the theological theory all the four pure types we have enumerated. God is for man 'Master' and 'Lord'. The Authority of the Master is therefore an integral element of global divine Authority. But God is also a 'Leader', the 'Lord of hosts' (Seboath), the political leader who guides his people while having knowledge in advance of their destinies. The element of the Authority of the Leader, therefore, is also involved in divine Authority. At the same time, 'divine Justice' is a religious category of primary importance, God being always conceived as the supreme Judge of man, as the sovereign embodiment of Justice and Equity: divine Authority integrates, therefore, also the element of the Authority of the Judge.

If, in order to make someone get out of my room, I have to use force, I have to change my own behaviour to realise the act in question, and I show through this behaviour that I have no authority; things are completely different if I do not move and this person leaves the room, that is to say, changes, as a result of my simply saying 'get out!' If the given order provokes a discussion, that is to say, forces the one who gives it to do something himself – namely engage in a discussion – as a function of this order, then there is no authority. And even less so if the discussion leads to giving up the order or even to a compromise, that is to say, precisely to changing the act that was supposed to provoke an outward change without itself changing.

The being invested with authority is then necessarily an agent, and the authoritarian act is always an absolute (conscious and free) act. However, the authoritarian act is distinguished from all other acts by the fact that it does not encounter opposition from the person or persons towards whom it is directed. This in turn presupposes both the possibility of opposing it and the conscious and voluntary renunciation of realising this possibility.

Starting with "I think," Descartes fixed his attention only on the "think," completely neglecting the "I." Now, this I is essential. For Man, and consequently the Philosopher, is not only Consciousness, but also—and above all—Self-Consciousness. Man is not only a being that thinks—i.e., reveals Being by Logos, by Speech formed of words that have a meaning. He reveals in addition—also by Speech—the being that reveals Being, the being that he himself is, the revealing being that he opposes to the revealed being by giving it the name Ich or Selbst, I or Self.