Neil H. Jacoby Quotes

Because conduct judged improper or illegal in one culture may be considered quite proper—even unavoidable—in other cultures, we have been chary of making moral judgments. Thus, we have sought to avoid the twin pitfalls of arrogant ethnocentrism and moral absolutism.

Political payments by multinational companies in foreign nations have long been a pervasive practice; but a cultural taboo against discussion of the subject, combined with a lack of public information, has created a vacuum in public understanding.

A foreign oil industry consisting mainly of private multinational companies competing in open markets has unique values to the Western World. Profit-motivated firms have proven to be better adapted to accept long-term risks and to allocate investment multinationally than have politically motivated government agencies.

World War I created a huge drain on U.S. oil. Fear of inadequate domestic reserves caused the U.S. government to urge its nationals to develop foreign sources and to support them in this effort. But American oil companies were unable to obtain exploration concessions in the Middle East and other areas because of the political influence of the British, Dutch, and French empires. The United States called for an ‘open door’ policy. Ultimately, after prolonged and stubborn British opposition, an agreement was made in 1928…

Before World War II, the United States Gulf and the Caribbean were the foreign world’s primary sources of crude oil. Eastern Hemisphere consumption was relatively small and yet its crude oil production supplied less than half of its petroleum needs.

The postwar burgeoning of oil enterprises throughout the world wrought important changes in the structure of the foreign oil industry. Competitors multiplied, concentration of the industry was reduced, and the market positions of the ‘seven largest’ companies shrank.

The competition of government oil companies with private enterprises was often buttressed by monopoly privileges, public preferences, low-priced capital, special tax benefits, or freedom from the commercial obligation to earn a normal return on investment. These government companies, regardless of whether they had complete or partial monopolies of oil production and trade in their own countries, were part of the structure of the foreign oil industry. They could not be dismissed as ‘noncompetitive’ with private oil enterprises.

One hallmark of a competitive market is that new firms are able to—and do—enter it… The key economic consideration is the relative difficulty of overcoming the barriers to entry, which can be measured by the advantages of established firms in the industry over potential entrants. In general, the relative difficulty of entry into any industry is determined by the amount of capital required for an efficient scale of operations,…

Expropriation and nationalization of private oil properties, and the growth of government oil companies, extended public ownership in oil. However, the primary result of postwar government petroleum policies was to enhance competition in the industry. Governments encouraged new entrants, which diffused the structure of the industry. The number of competing firms increased, and the market positions of the largest international oil companies declined, reducing concentration. As the entrants developed more concession areas, the growth of petroleum supply relative to demand accelerated, intensifying competition in both crude oil and product markets, and depressing prices and rates of return on investment.

The postwar tendency of foreign governments to intervene directly in the regulation of petroleum production and pricing contrasts sharply with the laissez-faire policies followed up to World War II. Formerly, rates of output and prices were almost entirely within the discretion of the private oil companies.

After World War II, foreign government levies on the incomes of private oil companies were progressively and substantially increased. This was true of both royalty and income tax rates… Later, the 50 percent rate of taxing foreign oil income was materially increased in many nations… Colombia’s oil law of 1962 changed the tax rate to 68 percent of net income from production. Contract agreements with Indonesia provided that 60 percent of profits would go to the government… The oil companies were unable to pass on all the increased costs per barrel to petroleum consumers after 1957, because of the redundancy of supplies.

The Soviet Union, as might be expected, conducted a ceaseless campaign to persuade the less-developed countries to nationalize their petroleum industries, by deprecating the record of private oil enterprises and extolling the virtues of governmental petroleum monopolies.

Foreign oil companies suffered major expropriations of their property during the postwar period, usually without payment of full compensation to the private owners. These episodes—the most significant were in Algeria, Ceylon, Cuba, Egypt , Iran, Libya, and Peru—followed by many years the first major oil industry expropriation by the Bolshevik government of Russia in 1918 and a second major expropriation of foreign oil properties by the Mexican government in 1938. All illustrated the great latent power of governments over the international oil companies and the reality of the political risks inherent in the industry.

Because exporting and importing nations have conflicting goals, and the interests of individual countries within each group are not identical, United Nations efforts to regulate the industry have not been successful.

Proven crude oil reserves in the foreign non-Communist world were estimated to be just under 41 billion barrels at the end of 1948; they had increased sixfold to 250 billion barrels by 1962 and then more than doubled this amount to 522 billion barrels by 1972. This increase over a twenty-four-year period was equivalent to an average annual compound growth rate of 11.2 percent—a spectacular expansion of the non-Communist world’s oil stock outside the United States and Canada.