Neil H. Jacoby Quotes

In 1949 coal met nearly two-thirds of the world’s energy needs, oil less than one-quarter, and natural gas about one-tenth, with water power a residual 2 percent. By 1971 the use of coal had dropped to one-third of world energy consumption, while the use of oil had risen to 43 percent and natural gas to 21 percent.

During the war years, the United States government gave serious thought to acquiring a direct interest in Arabian [oil] reserves.

The foreign oil industry was radically affected by World War II. The burden of meeting Allied military requirements fell largely on the United States. Between December of 1941 and August of 1945, nearly 7 billion barrels of oil were produced to meet the requirements of the United States and its allies, almost 6 billion barrels of which came from the United States.

Motivated partly by the decision to convert its navy from coal to oil, the British government ultimately acquired a major interest in what was then the only oil-producing company in the Middle East.

How did it come about that only a few international oil companies held concessions to all of this region Middle East at the end of World War II? The answer lies in the bitter struggle of the United States government to gain an entrance for its nationals into the British-dominated Middle East, a struggle which very significantly shaped the structure of the industry as it emerged from World War II.

In a world market that was free of all taxes, royalties, or other governmental constraints, and in which competition was effective, the price of oil would be very low. But the real-world market for oil is dominated by high taxation by the oil-exporting nations, and, since 1972, by concerted efforts of the members of the OPEC to raise prices and to restrict output. Because of effective competition in the industry and the power of OPEC, an international oil company today has relatively little influence on the price of oil to consumers.

World energy problems entered the headlines during 1973 and 1974 when members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) unilaterally quadrupled the price of crude oil. Concurrently, members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) cut back production and imposed a temporary embargo on shipments to the United States for political reasons. Suddenly, the industrialized nations awoke to their heavy and increasing dependence upon the abundant supplies of oil from Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.

A static technology is, however, almost inconceivable. It runs so strongly against established drives in American society as to be practically impossible. So long as we are thinking beings, we will find new ways to increase the productivity of work! The basic point, however, is that economic growth is needed to improve the quality of life. A rise in the GNP, taken by itself, is neither good nor bad. Everything depends upon what kind of production has increased, its costs to society, and who benefits from it. What people now want and need is resource-conserving, pollution-free growth—growth that does not harm the environment and demands less of the earth’s limited resources.

During the sixty years between 1910 and 1970, the percentage of Americans living in urban areas of 2,500 or more rose from 45.7 to 73.5, and the number of urbanites more than tripled from 42 to 150 million. Urbanization clearly has brought important benefits to people… But this overwhelming tendency of people to concentrate in cities has worsened the environment through crowding, traffic congestion, delays and loss of time, and the over-loading of transportation, marketing and living facilities.

Because contributions for charitable and educational purposes were the earliest form of corporate social action, their pattern enables us to test the validity of our theory. Corporate giving was stimulated by federal legislation in 1935 authorizing companies to deduct from taxable income up to 5 percent on account of such gifts.

Until 1837, companies were individually charted by ad hoc legislation. In that year Massachusetts enacted the first general corporation law, which was comparatively stringent in limiting corporate powers. Subsequently, motivated by the philosophy of free enterprise, as well as by competition among the states in charter-mongering, state corporation laws were progressively relaxed.

The basic flaw in the distribution of political power among American economic institutions is that producer interests rather than consumer interests tend to dominate and shape the actions of government.

Certainly the political assets of American labor organizations are formidable in both manpower and money. Unlike corporations, eighteen million union members vote. With the union shop prevailing in most states and union dues being deducted from members’ paychecks, labor unions have a steady inflow of funds, estimated to be around $700 million per year in 1963…Indeed, many a businessman seeking a favor from government has found that his most effective course was to get the support of the leaders of the unions representing his employees!

The primary difficulty is the problem of determining what the interest of business is.At any given time, business corporations are split on many national issues; there does not appear to be a monolithic ‘business interest.’ Thus, petroleum companies have opposed liberal oil import quotas, while petrochemical companies have favored them in order to obtain less expensive feedstocks; steel companies have sought restraints upon imports of foreign steel, whereas automobile companies and other large users of steel have fought them; and even with respect to such matters as labor union legislation or antipollution regulation, businessmen are far from presenting a united front because firms in some industries are much more deeply affected than those in other industries.

A second drastic reduction in the political power of American corporate business occurred during the Great Depression of the 1930’s. This crisis shook the faith of the American people in the capability of its industrial and financial leaders, even in the enterprise system itself… Roosevelt sought to make political capital of the popular disillusionment with business; and he made business a scapegoat for errors of federal economic policy that had deepened and prolonged the depression.