[O]ur conception of Chance is now utterly different from that of yore. Where we cannot predict, where we do not find order and regularity, there we should now assert... that something else than Chance is at work. What we are to understand by a chance distribution is one in accordance with law, and one the nature of which can... be closely predicted.

There is a danger of expecting the results of the future to be predicted from the past.

"The future is not a straight-line-projection of the past. Yet, most people - even scientists - think in linear, cause-effect patterns. The real world works differently: events follow discontinuous random walks, not predictable trends. At best, we can only assess the ‘likelihood of forthcoming events’. A rule-based approach is often misleading; to forecast future developments, we need probabilistic - rather than deterministic – thinking".

The uncertainty of the future is inescapable, one must think about it and arrive at plans for action. A statement attributed to a number of thinkers is, "Prediction is very difficult, especially of the future." Postdiction, knowing what went on in the past, is also difficult. The past, however, is our basis for understanding the future.

If the past, by bringing surprises, did not resemble the past previous to it (what I call the past's past), then why should our future resemble our current past?

The philosophy of the likelihood of events concludes that folk from different worlds must have different forms.

In stochastic processes the future is not uniquely determined, but we have at least probability relations enabling us to make predictions.

A... vicious effect of... is that those that are good at predicting the past... think of themselves as good at predicting the future... [W]e live in a world where important events are not predictable...

The basis of the [scientific] method is a belief in natural uniformity – if two events are regularly connected in our observations we can conclude that they obey a universal law. But this is not a conclusion we reach by observation. No amount of evidence can demonstrate the existence of laws of nature, since new experience can always overturn them. Science rests on the belief that the future will be like the past; but that belief is rationally groundless. This is not a new line of thinking. David Hume argued that the expectation that the future will be like the past, which is the basis of induction, is a matter of habit. Hume wanted to show that since miracles transgress known laws of nature it was unreasonable to accept reports of them, in the Bible or anywhere else. But his arguments against induction showed that the laws of nature could not in fact be known, so events that seemed impossible could happen at any time. The upshot was that faith in miracles returned by the back door of sceptical doubt.

The difference between past and future... cause and effect... memory and hope... regret and intention... in the elementary laws that describe the mechanisms of the world, there is no such difference.

Knowing the future is part of that future's past. Perhaps the foreseen happens because we try to change it.

Although there are those among us now who have been granted the gift of being able to glimpse patterns of the future, probabilities tossed like dice on the uneven blanket of space and time, even these gifted ones know that no single future has been preordained for us or our posterity. Events are fluid. The future is like smoke from a burning forest, waiting for the wind of specific events and personal courage to blow the sparks and embers of reality this way or that.

All futures are uncertain. We do our best to anticipate the future.

Each of us must live within that reality. Forecasting is not an exact science—the future leaves no footprints. We cannot predict the future because we cannot precisely measure the present. Quantum mechanics proved that. We live in a probability-based world. We all know that the sun will rise in the morning. But even that’s just a high probability. Nothing is assured—nothing.