I told David, “Go look at every store and its entire inventory, who we would sell it to and what we would get for it, in case the deal goes south.” It was a basic fire-sale analysis — what we’d get in the worst-case scenario if we had to liquidate the company. David came back and said, “We’d get 80 percent of our purchase price back.” So I knew that what we had to lose was 20 percent.
I’ve always valued long-term relationships, but John Hsieh, the former head of Itel’s container leasing business, taught me that you simply cannot succeed in-country without them. Hsieh had extensive international experience and contacts. He took me under his wing, and we traveled the world meeting Itel’s customers and suppliers — from a cocktail party in Rotterdam with British and German customers to a dinner in Hong Kong with a Chinese shipping company. The deep relationships he had with his customers enlightened me. I learned that the extreme degree to which you rely on strong personal relationships is perhaps the single biggest difference between doing business in the emerging markets and the U.S.
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A Jewish refugee delegation, including my father, went to the Vilnius Japanese vice consul, Chiune Sugihara, for these transit visas. Sugihara wired Tokyo three times for permission to help the refugees, but was denied each time. The vice consul was a Japanese career diplomat, but he had also been raised in a middle-class samurai family. And part of the code of the samurai is benevolence and mercy, and appreciation and respect for life. Despite the risk to his career and his family, Sugihara ignored his direct orders and decided to do as much as he could. For the next month, he and his wife barely stopped to eat or sleep as they wrote out thousands of transit visas. My family was among the six thousand Jews Sugihara saved — the Sugihara Survivors.
Years later, people would ask me, “How did you know when and what to buy?” But all I basically did was create a massive arbitrage — a fixed-rate instrument in an inflationary environment. I essentially took on $4 billion of nonrecourse debt at an average interest rate of 6 percent in an environment with inflation of 9 percent or higher. That means I was already making 3 percent returns the second the deal closed — without doing a thing to the assets. Sure, we picked some terrific properties, but every one didn’t have to be Class A.
But by the end, we had raised over $1 billion. I think it was the largest fund of its kind at the time. We focused on turning around companies that had taken on excessive debt in the 1980s. We contributed our own capital in order to align our interests with those of our investors, and we didn’t charge fees on each acquisition like many leveraged-buyout firms did. Instead, we used the funds to share risk with our investors — and to share opportunities. We had a stated objective of holding our investments for ten to twelve years.
So I called Merrill Lynch and said, “I want to create an opportunity fund wherein investors put up cash to become my partners in the purchase of distressed real estate.” No one, including me, had done this kind of fund before, but they thought it was a great idea. They put up 5 percent of the first fund’s target and said they’d raise the balance of the capital. Six months later, we still had no commitments. Not one. So I took over the process and hit the road — from May 10 through June 30, 1989. I found that to raise money, I had to do it personally. I traveled with Merrill forty-two of those fifty-two days and did every single presentation — typically three to four a day in different cities.