Montesquieu Quotes

Very good laws may be ill timed.

MOST legislators have been men of inferior capacity whom chance exalted over their fellows, and who took counsel almost exclusively of their own prejudices and whims.

It would seem that they had not even a sense of the greatness and dignity of their work: they amused themselves by framing childish institutions, well devised indeed to please small minds, but discrediting their authors with people of sense.

They flung themselves into useless details; and gave their attention to individual interests: the sign of the narrow genius, which grasps things piecemeal and cannot take a general view.

Some of them have been so affected as to employ another language than the vernacular-a ridiculous thing in a framer of laws; for how can they be obeyed if they are not known?

They have often abolished needlessly those which were already established-that is to say, they have plunged nations into the confusion which always accompanies change.

It is true that, by reason of some extravagance springing rather from the nature than from the mind of man, it is sometimes necessary to change certain laws. But the case is rare; and when it happens it requires the most delicate handling; much solemnity ought to be observed, and endless precautions taken, in order to lead the people to the natural conclusion that the laws are most sacred, since so many formalities are necessary to their abrogation.

Often they have made them too subtle, following logical instead of natural equity. As a consequence such laws have been found too severe; and a spirit of justice required that they should be set aside; but the cure was as bad as the disease. Whatever the laws may be, obedience to them is necessary; they are to be regarded as the public conscience, with which all private consciences ought to be in conformity.

(Letter #79)

The success of most things depends upon knowing how long it will take to succeed.

Paris est peut-être la ville du monde la plus sensuelle, et où l'on raffine le plus sur les plaisirs; mais c'est peut-être celle où l'on mène une vie plus dure. Pour qu'un homme vive délicieusement, il faut que cent autres travaillent sans relâche.

Commerce is a cure for the most destructive prejudices; for it is almost a general rule, that wherever we find agreeable manners, there commerce flourishes; and that wherever there is commerce, there we meet with agreeable manners.

La puissance illimitée de nos sublimes sultans, qui n'a d'autre règle qu'elle-même, ne produit pas plus de monstres que cet art indigne qui veut faire plier la justice, tout inflexible qu'elle est.

There is only one thing that can form a bond between men, and that is gratitude...we cannot give someone else greater power over us than we have ourselves.

Superioritatea dragostei asupra dezmăţului provine din înmulţirea plăcerilor. Toate gândurile, dorinţele, simţămintele devin reciproce. În dragoste, aveţi două trupuri şi două suflete ; în desfrâu, aveţi un suflet care se scârbeşte chiar de propriul său trup.

Ces monarques sont comme le soleil, qui porte partout la chaleur et la vie.

Useless laws weaken the necessary laws.

- « Les lois y [dans une monarchie] tiennent la place de toutes ces vertus, dont on n’a aucun besoin ; l’État vous en dispense: une action qui se fait sans bruit, y est en quelque façon sans conséquence. » Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des Lois, 1748, Book 2, Ch. 5,

A person of my acquaintance said: . . .

'Study has always been for me the sovereign remedy against life's unpleasantness, since I have never experienced any sorrow that an hour's reading did not eliminate.

If one only wished to be Sad, this could be horrible for the rest of civilisation; but we wish to be happier than other people, and this is always difficult, for we believe others to be happier than they are.

Depuis que je suis en Europe, mon cher Rhédi, j'ai vu bien des gouvernements : ce n'est pas comme en Asie, où les règles de la politique se trouvent partout les mêmes.

In every government there are three sorts of power: the legislative; the executive in respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive in regard to matters that depend on the civil law.
By virtue of the first, the prince or magistrate enacts temporary or perpetual laws, and amends or abrogates those that have been already enacted. By the second, he makes peace or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public security, and provides against invasions. By the third, he punishes criminals, or determines the disputes that arise between individuals. The latter we shall call the judiciary power, and the other, simply, the executive power of the state.
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Again, there is no liberty if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression.
There would be an end of every thing, were the same man, or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals.
The executive power ought to be in the hands of a monarch, because this branch of government, having need of dispatch, is better administered by one than by many: on the other hand, whatever depends on the legislative power, is oftentimes better regulated by many than by a single person.
But, if there were no monarch, and the executive power should be committed to a certain number of persons, selected from the legislative body, there would