If the senses and the consciousness had an unlimited scope, if in the double direction of matter and mind the faculty of perceiving was indefinite, one would not need to conceive any more than to reason. Conceiving is a make-shift when perception is not granted us, and reasoning is done in order to fill up the gaps of perception or to extend its scope.
French philosopher (1859–1941)
Henri-Louis Bergson (18 October 1859 – 4 January 1941) was a major French philosopher, influential in the first half of the 20th century. He was awarded the 1927 Nobel Prize in Literature.
From: Wikiquote (CC BY-SA 4.0)
Alternative Names:
Henri-Louis Bergson
•
H. Bergson
•
Henry Bergson
•
Henri Louis Bergson
•
Berxon
From Wikidata (CC0)
Mesmo para aqueles dentre nós que ela fez artistas, foi por acaso, e apenas parcialmente, que ela levantou o véu. Apenas numa direção ela esqueceu de ligar a percepção à necessidade. E como cada direção corresponde ao que chamamos de sentido, é por um desses sentidos, e apenas por esse sentido, que o artista em geral se consagra à arte. Daí, na origem, a diversidade das artes. Daí também a especialidade das
predisposições. Um artista se aplicará às cores e às formas, e como ama a cor pela cor, a forma pela forma, como as percebe por elas e não para ele, é a vida interior das coisas que ele verá transparecer através de suas formas e cores. Ele fará a vida entrar aos poucos em nossa percepção a princípio confundida. Por um momento pelo menos ele nos desligará dos preconceitos de forma e cor que se interpunham entre nosso olho e a realidade. E realizará assim a mais alta ambição da arte, que é no caso a de nos revelar a natureza.
Concordo em que Shakespeare não tenha sido nem Macbeth, nem Hamlet, nem Otelo; mas ele teria sido esses personagens diversos se as circunstâncias por um lado, e por outro o consentimento de sua vontade, houvessem levado ao estado de erupção
violenta o que nele não passava de impulso interior. E enganar-se estranhamente sobre o papel da imaginação poética acreditar que ela compõe seus heróis com pedaços tirados aqui e ali em torno dela, como para costurar uma roupa de arlequim. Nada de vivo sairia disso. A vida não se recompõe. Ela simplesmente se deixa contemplar. A imaginação poética só pode ser uma visão completa da realidade. Se os personagens criados pelo poeta nos dão a impressão de vida, é que são o próprio poeta, o poeta multiplicado, o poeta aprofundando-se a si mesmo num esforço de observação interior tão poderoso que capta o virtual no real e retoma o que a natureza deixou nele em estado de esboço ou de simples projeto para dele fazer uma obra completa.
One could say as much for perception. The auxiliary of action, it isolates that part of reality as a whole that interests us; it shows us less the things themselves than the use we can make of them. It classifies, it labels them beforehand; we scarcely look at the object, it is enough for us to know to which category it belongs. But now and then, by a lucky accident, men arise whose senses or whose consciousness are less adherent to life. Nature has forgotten to attach their faculty of perceiving to their faculty of acting. When they look at a thing, they see it for itself, and not for themselves. They do not perceive simply with a view to action; they perceive in order to perceive, — for nothing, for the pleasure of doing so.
The rule of science is the one posited by Bacon: obey in order to command. The philosopher neither obeys nor commands; he seeks to be at one with nature. From this point of view, moreover, the essence of philosophy is the spirit of simplicity. Whether we contemplate the philosophical spirit in itself or in its works, whether we compare philosophy to science or one philosophy with other philosophies, we always find that any complication is superficial, that the construction is a mere accessory, synthesis a semblance: the act of philosophising is a simple one.
If my views were generally judged to be paradoxical when they made their appearance, some of them are commonplace today; others bid fair to become so. Let us admit that they could not at first be accepted. It would have meant tearing oneself away from deeply-rooted habits, veritable extensions of nature. All our ways of speaking, thinking, perceiving imply in effect that immobility and immutability are there by right, that movement and change are superadded, like accidents, to things which, by themselves, do not move and, in themselves, do not change. The representation of change is that of qualities or states, which supposedly follow one another in a substance. Each of these qualities, each of these states would be something stable, change being made of their succession: as for substance, whose role is to support the states and qualities which succeed one another, it would be stability itself. Such is the logic immanent in our languages and formulated once and for all by Aristotle: the intelligence has as its essence to judge, and judgment operates by the attribution of a predicate to a subject. The subject, by the sole fact of being named, is defined as invariable; the variation will reside in the diversity of the states that one will affirm concerning it, one after another.
Try QuoteGPT
Chat naturally about what you need. Each answer links back to real quotes with citations.
Once the relation of science and metaphysics with “intellectual intuition” is misunderstood, Kant has no difficulty in showing that our science is entirely relative and our metaphysics wholly artificial. Because he strained the independence of the understanding in both cases, because he relieved metaphysics and science of the “intellectual intuition” which gave them their inner weight, science with its relations presents to him only an outer wrapping of form, and metaphysics with its things, an outer wrapping of matter. Is it surprising, then, that the first shows him only frameworks within frameworks, and the second phantoms pursuing phantoms? He struck our science and metaphysics such rude blows that they have not yet entirely recovered from their shock. Our mind would willingly resign itself to see in science a wholly relative knowledge and in metaphysics an empty speculation. It seems to us even today that Kantian criticism applies to all metaphysics and to all science. In reality it applies especially to the philosophy of the ancients, as well as to the form — still ancient — that the moderns have given most often to their thought. It is valid against a metaphysics which claims to give us a unique and ready-made system of things, against a science which would be a unique system of relations, finally against a science and a metaphysics which present themselves with the architectural simplicity of the Platonic theory of Ideas, or of a Greek temple. If metaphysics claims to be made up of concepts we possessed prior to it, if it consists in an ingenious arrangement of pre-existing ideas which we utilize like the materials of construction for a building, in short, if it is something other than the constant dilation of our mind, the constantly renewed effort to go beyond our actual ideas and perhaps our simple logic as well, it is too evident that it becomes artificial like all works of pure understanding. And if science is wholly the work of analysis or of conceptua
La sensatez consiste en saber recordar, de acuerdo, pero también y sobre todo en saber olvidar. La sensatez es el esfuerzo de una mente que se adapta y readapta sin cesar, cambiando de idea cuando cambia de objeto. Es una movilidad de la inteligencia que se ajusta con exactitud a la movilidad de las cosas. Es la moviente continuidad de nuestra atención a la vida.