Henri Bergson Quotes

"Mais, si le souvenir n'a pas été emmagasiné par le cerveau, où donc se conserve-t-il ? - A vrai dire, je ne suis pas sûr que la question "où" ait encore un sens quand on ne parle plus d'un corps."

Time is invention and nothing else.

[...] le cerveau ne détermine pas la pensée ; et par conséquent la pensée, en grande partie du moins, est indépendante du cerveau.

L’homme est faber avant d’être sapiens.
(…) Seule l’intuition va au cœur du réel et permet de connaître le temps véritable qu’est la durée intérieure. C’est « la connaissance directe de l’esprit par l’esprit » au-delà de la médiation du langage incapable de saisir le « moi fondamental

O rígido, o já feito, o mecânico, contrariamente ao maleável, ao continuadamente cambiante, ao vivo, o desvio contrariamente à atenção, enfim, o automatismo contrastando com a atividade livre, eis em suma o que o riso ressalta e pretende corrigir.

A philosopher worthy of the name has never said more than a single thing: and even then it is something he has tried to say, rather than actually said. And he has said only one thing because he has seen only one point: and at that it was not so much a vision as a contact: this contact has furnished an impulse, this impulse a movement, and if this movement, which is as it were a kind of swirling of dust taking a particular form, becomes visible to our eyes only through what it has collected along its way, it is no less true that other bits of dust might as well have been raised and that it would still have been the same whirlwind. Thus a thought which brings something new into the world is of course obliged to manifest itself through the ready-made ideas it comes across and draws into its movement; it seems thus, as it were, relative to the epoch in which the philosopher lived; but that is frequently merely an appearance. The philosopher might have come several centuries earlier; he would have had to deal with another philosophy and another science; he would have given himself other problems; he would have expressed himself by other formulas; not one chapter perhaps of the books he wrote would have been what it is; and nevertheless he would have said the same thing.

We seize, in the act of perception, something which outruns perception itself.

One currently and perhaps imprudently calls “reason” this conservative logic which governs thought in common; conversation greatly resembles conservation. It is there that it is at home. And there it exercises a legitimate authority. Theoretically, in fact, conversation should bear only upon things of the social life. And the essential object of society is to insert a certain fixity into universal mobility. Societies are just so many islands consolidated here and there in the ocean of becoming.

Ora se enunciará o que deveria ser fingindo-se acreditar ser precisamente o que é. Nisso consiste a ironia. Ora, pelo contrário, se descreverá cada vez mais meticulosamente o que é, fingindo-se crer que assim é que as coisas deveriam ser. É o caso do humor. O humor, assim definido, é o inverso da
ironia. Ambos são formas da sátira, mas a ironia é de natureza retórica, ao passo que o humor tem algo de mais científico. Acentua-se a ironia deixando-se arrastar cada vez mais alto pela idéia do bem que deveria ser. Por isso a ironia pode aquecer-se interiormente até se tornar, de algum modo, eloqüência sob pressão. Acentua-se o humor, pelo contrário, descendo-se cada vez mais baixo no interior do mal que é, para lhe notar as particularidades com mais fria indiferença. Vários autores, entre os quais Jean Paul, observaram que o humor gosta dos termos concretos, dos pormenores técnicos,, dos fatos rigorosos. Se nossa análise estiver certa, não se trata de um feitio casual do humor, mas nisso consiste a sua própria essência. O humorista é no caso um moralista disfarçado em cientista, algo como um anatomista que só faça dissecação para nos
desagradar; e o humor, no sentido restrito que damos à palavra, é de fato uma transposição do moral em científico.

The universe is a machine for the making of Gods.

Social thought is unable not to keep its original structure.

I cannot escape the objection that there is no state of mind, however simple, that does not change every moment.

Here I would point out, as a symptom equally worthy of notice, the ABSENCE OF FEELING which usually accompanies laughter. It seems as though the comic could not produce its disturbing effect unless it fell, so to say, on the surface of a soul that is thoroughly calm and unruffled. Indifference is its natural environment, for laughter has no greater foe than emotion. I do not mean that we could not laugh at a person who inspires us with pity, for instance, or even with affection, but in such a case we must, for the moment, put our affection out of court and impose silence upon our pity. In a society composed of pure intelligences there would probably be no more tears, though perhaps there would still be laughter; whereas highly emotional souls, in tune and unison with life, in whom every event would be sentimentally prolonged and re-echoed, would neither know nor understand laughter.

[W]ithin our ego, there is succession without mutual externality; outside the ego, in pure space, mutual externality without succession.

De um mal entendido sobre isso é que nasceu a celeuma entre o realismo e o idealismo na arte. Sem dúvida, a arte nada mais é que uma visão mais direta da realidade. Mas essa pureza de percepção implica uma ruptura com a convenção utilitária, um desprendimento inato e especificamente localizado do sentido ou da consciência, enfim, certa imaterialidade de vida, que vem a ser o que sempre se chamou de idealismo. Por conseguinte, pode-se afirmar, sem jogar de modo algum com o sentido das palavras, que o realismo está na obra quando o idealismo está na alma, e que só à força de idealidade se toma contato com a realidade.