Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Quotes

…if geometry were as much opposed to our passions and present interests as is ethics, we should contest it and violate I but little less, notwithstanding all the demonstrations of Euclid and Archimedes…

For the [innate] general principles enter into our thoughts, of which they form the soul and the connection. They are as necessary thereto as the muscles and sinews are for walking, although we do not at all think of them.

It is true that as the empty voids and the dismal wilderness belong to zero, so the spirit of God and His light belong to the all-powerful One.

He who understands Archimedes and Apollonius will admire less the achievements of the foremost men of later times.

When the origin of remote peoples goes beyond history, our languages show themselves their oldest monuments

I don't really eliminate body, but reduce it to what it is. For I show that corporeal mass, which is thought to have something over and above simple substances, is not a substance, but a phenomenon resulting from simple substances, which alone have unity and absolute reality.

[...] Et celui de la raison suffisante, en vertu duquel nous considérons qu’aucun fait ne saurait se trouver vrai, ou existant, aucune énonciation véritable, sans qu’il y ait une raison suffisante pourquoi il en soit ainsi et non pas autrement. Quoique ces raisons le plus souvent ne puissent point nous être connues.
[sect. 32]

Milovať znamená radovať sa z cudzieho šťastia.

The present state of a single substance is the natural result of its precedent state, so much so that the present is pregnant with the future.

La tranquillité est un degré pour avancer vers la stupidité. . . Il faut toujours trouver quelque chose à faire, penser, projeter, s'intéresser, pour le public et pour le particulier, mais cela d'une manière qui nous réjouisse, si nos souhaits sont accomplis et ne nous chagrine point en cas qu'ils manquent.

[...] c’est que jamais rien n’arrive, sans qu’il y ail une cause ou du moins une raison déterminante, c’est-à-dire quelque chose qui puisse servir à rendre a priori, pourquoi cela est existant plulôt que de toute autre façon. Ce grand principe a lieu dans tous les événements, et on ne donnera jamais un exemple contraire : et quoique le plus souvent ces raisons déterminantes ne nous soient pas assez connues, nous ne laissons pas d’entrevoir qu’il y en a.
Essais de Théodicée, 1.44

Que as meditações dos teólogos e dos filósofos conhecidos por escolásticos não são inteiramente desprezíveis

Sei que enuncio um grande paradoxo ao pretender reabilitar de certo modo a antiga filosofia, e recordar postlimino as formas substanciais já quase banidas; mas, talvez não me condenem levianamente quando se souber que meditei bastante sobre a filosofia moderna, que dediquei muito tempo às experiências da física e às demonstrações da geometria, que estive muito tempo persuadido da fragilidade desses entes, que fui, enfim, obrigado a retomar contra a própria vontade e como que à força, depois de eu próprio ter feito investigações que me levaram a reconhecer que os nossos modernos não fazem suficientemente justiça a S. Tomás de Aquino e a outros grandes homens desse tempo, e que há, nas opiniões dos filósofos e teólogos escolásticos, muito mais solidez do que se imagina, contando que delas nos sirvamos a propósito e no seu lugar. Estou mesmo persuadido de que, se algum espírito exacto e meditativo se desse ao trabalho de esclarecer e digerir o pensamento deles à maneira dos geómetras analíticos, encontraria aí um tesouro de grande quantidade de verdades importantíssimas e absolutamente demonstrativas.

"If my opinion that substance requires a true unity were founded only on a definition I had formulated in opposition to common usage, *then the dispute would be only one of words*. But besides the fact that most philosophers have taken the term in almost the same fashion, distinguishing between a unity in itself and an accidental unity, between substantial and accidental form, and between perfect and imperfect, natural and artificial mixtures, I take things to a much higher level, and setting aside the question of terminology, *I believe that where there are only beings by aggregation, there aren't any real beings*. For every being by aggregation presupposes beings endowed with real unity, because every being derives its reality only from the reality of those beings of which it is composed, so that it will not have any reality at all if each being of which it is composed is itself a being by aggregation, a being for which we must still seek further grounds for its reality, grounds which can never be found in this way, if we must always continue to seek for them. I agree, Sir, that there are only machines (that are often animated) in all of corporeal nature, but I do not agree that *there are only aggregates of substances, there must also be true substances from which all the aggregates result.
We must, then, necessarily come down to the atoms of Epicurus and Cordemoy (which are things you reject along with me), or else we must admit that we do not find any reality in bodies; or finally, we must recognize some substances that have a true unity. I have already said in another letter that the composite made up of the diamonds of the Grand Duke and of the Great Mogul can be called a pair of diamonds, but this is only a being of reason. And when they are brought closer to one another, it would be a being of the imagination or perception, that is to say, a phenomenon. For contact, common motion, and participation in a common plan have no effect on substantial unity. It is

... for although people can be made worse off by all other gifts, correct reasoning alone can only be for the good.

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